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Abstract 
 
As an archetypal case of late and recurring lustration and communist security service file 
access, Poland provides us with an excellent basis for developing frameworks to explain this 
phenomenon. This paper examines whether and how the explanations available in the 
comparative and theoretical literature that has developed in recent years on lustration and 
transitional justice in the newly emerging democracies of post-communist Central and 
Eastern Europe help us to understand the extent and recurrence of lustration and file access 
in countries like post-communist Poland. It shows how these issues became entwined with 
other discourses and developments in post-communist politics and identifies two such fields 
of debate which could form the basis for more detailed, grounded research both on the Polish 
case specifically and other cases of ‘late lustration’ more generally. Firstly, the re-
emergence of the lustration and file access issue as an element of broader concerns about the 
need to improve the quality of post-communist democracy more generally. Secondly, the way 
that the issue became embroiled in what might be termed the ‘politics of history’ as a means 
of using historical narratives to buttress and question the legitimacy of political actors. 
Considering how states such as Poland deal with the communist past is, therefore, not just 
interesting in its own right but also has the capacity to provide us with insights into patterns 
of post-communist politics in these countries more generally. 
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Having previously been one of the most under-researched and scantily understood areas of 
transitional justice, the former Soviet Union and Eastern bloc has become a growing area of 
research and academic discussion in recent years. Although it started as a subject for 
historians and lawyers primarily, there is now an expanding political science literature which 
looks at the measures taken by the former communist states to deal with past atrocities and 
overcome the legacy of communist dictatorship. However, despite the existence of a large 
and expanding comparative literature on this topic, the late implementation of lustration and 
access to communist-era security service files - together with the intense, on-going and 
recurring politicisation of the issue - in countries like Poland remains something of a puzzle. 
It is this puzzle, of ‘late’ lustration and communist security service file access, that this paper 
seeks to address by surveying the explanations available in the existing literature and, on the 
basis of the Polish case, seeking to develop a tentative explanatory framework. 
 
The paper begins by examining the various definitional debates in the comparative literature 
that have sought to answer the questions of: (a) what is lustration and (b) how does it fit in 
with other transitional justice measures? Here the importance of focusing on lustration as a (if 
not the) key (and certainly most controversial) transitional justice mechanism in the post-
communist states of central and Eastern Europe is considered together with the argument that 
one needs to examine lustration laws in conjunction with the question of access to 
communist-era security service files more generally. The paper then moves on to reflect on 
why Poland is interesting as a case of late (and recurring) lustration by running through the 
progress of the various attempts to introduce lustration and file access laws in this country. 
This began with a communist-forgiving approach exemplified by the so-called ‘thick line’ 
policy that avoided radical transitional justice measures. However, although one might have 
expected the issue to fade from public memory, it remained on the political agenda and the 
following years were punctured by various attempts to renew efforts at securing transitional 
justice, before belated lustration and file access laws were finally adopted at the end of the 
1990s. Attempts were then made to extend these truth revelation processes in the mid-2000s 
culminating in them finally being amended in 2006 and 2007 to radically expand their scope. 
In the course of this discussion, the paper attempts to locate Poland within the various 
comparative typologies that have been developed to categorise lustration laws and so-called 
‘lustration systems’. 
 
The paper moves on to examine whether and how the large and growing literature that has 
developed in recent years on lustration and transitional justice in the newly emerging 
democracies of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe helps us to understand the extent 
and recurrence of lustration and file access in countries like post-communist Poland. It begins 
by looking at attempts to explain such variance using structural factors such as the nature of 
the previous regime and transition to democracy in that country. It moves on to consider what 
might be termed ‘politics of the present’ approaches, which stress the role of post-communist 
party political competition as a key explanatory variable, and those that have tried to refine 
historical-structural and transition-type approaches, sometimes by supplementing them with 
5 
 
‘politics of the present’ type explanations. It then considers one particular variant of the 
‘politics of the present’ approach, what might be termed the ‘political elite strategy 
explanation’, which is based on the notion that political actors responded rationally to 
impulses such as (actual or anticipated) popular and societal demand to further their own 
partisan interests. It also examines attempts to account for different patterns of lustration and 
transitional justice, including the recurrence of the issue and changes of trajectory, through 
examining ideological-programmatic factors, based on the idea that political elites believed, 
or came to believe, that a more radical approach to such issues was both necessary and 
desirable from a normative perspective. 
 
Finally, the paper considers how examining how post-communist states such as Poland deal 
with the communist past is worth looking at not just because it tells us more about the causes 
and consequences of belated lustration, file access and transitional justice but because it is 
also interesting in its own right. These issues became entwined with other debates so 
examining them tells us, or at least has the capacity to tell us, something about post-
communist politics more generally. This, it will be argued, was because the emergence of late 
lustration and file access were often felt to be indicative of the need to deepen post-
communist democratisation and linked to efforts to improve the quality of post-communist 
democracy more generally, as well as becoming entangled in what might be termed the 
‘politics of history’ rather than the politics of transitional justice. 
 
What are lustration and file access and why do they matter? 
 
So what are lustration and file access? How do they fit in with other transitional justice 
measures? And why are they important to examine, particularly in relation to the way that 
post-communist states have pursued transitional justice? Stan defines transitional justice as: 
‘the measures and policies adopted by governments and civil society actors to address, and 
possibly redress, legacies of widespread and systematic human rights abuse, mass atrocity, 
genocide or civil war.’1 According to Nalepa, the transitional justice literature is ‘an inter-
disciplinary field concerned with how democracies deal with collaborators of the past 
regime.’2 It has, she argues, both a normative component originating in the literature on legal 
and constitutional theory that examines possible reasons for (and problems created by) 
retroactivity, and a positive component trying to explain empirically occurring phenomena 
such: as why democracies try to right wrongs, who are the actors responsible for 
implementing transitional justice measures, and whether or not these institutions have led to 
reconciliation? 
 
The repertoire of transitional justice procedures is vast and diverse but, as Nalepa points out, 
can be divided into four broad sets of measures.
3
 Firstly, using court trials and criminal 
proceedings to bring prominent or representative members of the former dictatorial regime to 
trial; particularly those who are accused of being perpetrators of human rights violations. This 
can include both high ranking dignitaries and low ranking officials such as secret service 
officers and agents. Secondly, compensation packages for victims and/or their surviving 
relatives such as: official apologies; monetary compensation; and restitution of rights to, and 
                                                          
1
 See: Lavinia Stan, ‘Transitional Justice’, SciTopics, February 6 2009, 
http://www.scitopics.com/Transitional_Justice.html (accessed February 6 2014). 
2
 See: Monika Nalepa, Skeletons in Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, p165. 
3
 See: Skeletons in Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe, p5. 
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the return of, property expropriated by the former regime. Thirdly, legal or symbolic acts 
directed against the former regime such as: legislation condemning it and expropriating the 
former rulers of their assets; programmes to re-write history textbooks in order to better 
reflect the plight of the victims of the regimes; changing the names of streets and localities; 
opening new museums and exhibitions; and removing statues associated with the regime. 
Fourthly what might be termed truth revelation procedures.
4
 These include: vetting public 
officials for links with the former regime’s security services as secret police officers and 
informers and possibly banning them (together with other prominent or representative 
members of the former regime) from public office and positions of influence in society. They 
may also involve: de-classifying and opening up the extant secret archives and files of the 
former security services for public inspection; and establishing truth commissions, temporary 
bodies of formal inquiry appointed to re-examine the past and document the repressive 
activities of the previous regime (sometimes with the objective of achieving societal 
reconciliation). 
 
Why is it worth focusing particularly on lustration and other truth revelation procedures as 
transitional justice mechanisms in the post-communist context? Lustration was one of, if not 
the, most important and controversial transitional justice method to be used in post-
communist Central and Eastern Europe. The region was the first to embrace it so 
comprehensively and it remained an important tool of transitional justice; so much so that, as 
Stan put, it ‘(many) observers have employed it as a yardstick for measuring the progress of 
transitional justice in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union’. 5 The fact that lustration 
was a particularly salient issue, and the primary means by which transitional justice was often 
pursued and measured in post-communist states, could be attributed to the level of societal 
surveillance by the communist authorities. Infiltration by informants became the prevalent 
means by which communist regimes harassed their opponents. This was particularly the case 
towards the end of communist rule as the random terror and enforced societal mobilisation of 
the Stalinist totalitarian period gave way to a political strategy based on atomisation and 
pervasive mass surveillance that characterised the so-called ‘post-totalitarian’ period.6 As a 
consequence, hundreds of thousands of citizens were functionaries of or collaborators with 
the internal security services, leaving these countries to deal with what Linz and Stepan have 
dubbed the ‘informer legacy’.7  
 
The term ‘lustration’ had long been used by Slavophone archivists simply to refer to the 
compilation of an inventory or register. To lustrate someone was to check whether their name 
appeared in a database. The term was more widely adopted not because, as is commonly 
                                                          
4
 See: Marek M. Kaminski and Monika Nalepa, ‘Judging Transitional Justice: A New Criterion for Evaluating 
Truth Revelation Procedures’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 50, No 3, June 2006, pp383-408; and 
Monika Nalepa, ‘To Punish the Guilty and Protect the Innocent: Comparing Truth Revelation Procedures’, 
Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol 2 No 2, April 2008, pp221-245. 
5
 See: Lavinia Stan, ‘Introduction: Post-communist transition, justice, and transitional justice’ in Lavinia Stan, 
ed, Transitional Justice in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, Routledge: London and New York, 
2009, pp1-14 (12). 
6
 See: Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, 
South American and Post-communist Europe, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp42-51. 
7
 See: Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p251. For example, in a journalistic account of 
transitional justice in the Czech Republic, German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Poland, Rosenberg draws 
attention to the fact that in authoritarian Latin America repression was ‘deep’, while in post-totalitarian Eastern 
Europe it was ‘wide’ to explain why so few court proceedings were launched against communist leaders and 
secret agents. See: ‘Transitional Justice’. 
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alleged, of its etymological association with ancient Roman rites of purification, but because 
politicians and the public heard it used by bureaucrats during battles for control of 
Czechoslovak files in early 1990s. Definitional debates over the term have focused on: 
whether it should encompass the exclusion from, or limiting of access to, certain offices or 
simply vetting individuals to identify those who worked for and collaborated with the 
communist secret services; and whether this vetting and exclusion should also encompass 
communist party officials above a certain level. David, for example, defines lustration as ‘the 
examination of certain groups of people, especially politicians, public officials, and judges, to 
determine whether they had been members or collaborators of the secret police, or held any 
other positions in the repressive apparatus of the totalitarian regime’ (emphasis added).8 
Similarly, Stan defines it as: ‘the banning of communist officials and secret police officers 
and informers from post-communist politics and positions of influence in society’ (emphasis 
added).
9
 
 
My own preference is to adopt the Polish convention which defines lustration as being aimed 
at revealing whether an individual (generally an occupant of, or candidate for, a particular 
post) had links with the communist regime that were kept secret from the public such as 
working, or collaborating as an informer, for the communist security services. Leadership (or 
even membership) of the communist party or employment in other branches of the party-state 
bureaucracy was more openly known. In terms of whether consequences follow automatically, 
reflecting the broader vernacular usage of the term across the region,
 10
 I would argue that 
lustration includes all forms of vetting and file access and not simply those which carry the 
consequence of (automatic) exclusion. Consequently, I am inclined to stick to the definition 
of lustration that I helped to develop in earlier work with Williams and Fowler where we 
defined it as ‘measures directed against former officers of and collaborators with the state 
security apparatus.’11 As I pointed out in an earlier single-authored paper, this could include 
‘simply vetting or screening individuals for past associations with the communist security 
services without any sanction necessarily following (other than the damage to their reputation 
that the disclosure of this information could cause).…(rather than necessarily also) then 
attempting to automatically exclude them from public life on the basis of such links’.12 
Moreover, although the terms ‘lustration’ and ‘de-communisation’ are often used 
interchangeably, I would argue it is important to distinguish the two processes with the latter 
                                                          
8
 See: Roman David, ‘Lustration Laws in Action: The Motives and Evaluation of Lustration Policy in the Czech 
Republic and Poland (1989-2001)’, Law and Social Inquiry, Vol 28 No 2, April 2003, pp387-439 (388). 
9
 See: ‘Introduction: Post-communist transition, justice, and transitional justice’, p11. 
10
 Although in some countries, such as Hungary and the former GDR, the term is not actually used at all to 
describe truth revelation procedures. 
11
 See: Kieran Williams, Brigid Fowler and Aleks Szczerbiak, ‘Explaining Lustration in Central Europe: A 
“Post-communist Politics” Approach’, Democratization, Vol 12 No 1, February 2005, pp22-43 (23). 
12
 See: Aleks Szczerbiak, ‘Dealing with the Communist Past or the Politics of the Present? Lustration in Post-
Communist Poland’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol 54 No 4, June 2002, pp553-572 (553). Interestingly, having 
initially defined lustration as a set of ‘laws limiting the access to public office of politicians with an authoritarian 
past’ (See: ‘To Punish the Guilty and Protect the Innocent’, p222) or ‘a truth revelation procedure in which 
public officials who collaborated with the former authoritarian regime are disqualified from holding high-level 
public positions in the public sector’ (See: Monika Nalepa, ‘Lustration’ in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed. The Pursuit 
of International Criminal Justice: A World Survey on Conflicts, Victimization, and Post-Conflict Justice. 
Volume 1, 2010, Mortsel: Intersentia, pp735-778 [735-6]) (emphasis added), Nalepa also went on to adopt a 
broader definition as of the process as simply ‘revealing links to the former communist secret police of persons 
holding public office’ (See: Monika Nalepa, ‘Lustration as a Trust-Building Mechanism? Transitional Justice in 
Poland’ in Monica Serrano and Vesselin Popovski, eds, After Oppression: Transitional Justice in Latin America 
and Eastern Europe, Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press 2012, pp333-362 [333]). 
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referring to the wider removal from public life of the former functionaries of the communist 
party or related institutions (generally above a certain rank).
13
 
 
Although scholars such as David view lustration primarily as a ‘personnel system’,14 it can 
also - or perhaps, more accurately, even more so - be seen as a ‘truth revelation procedure’. 
Moreover, lustration, in the sense of truth revelation, depends a great deal upon access to the 
secret archives compiled by the communist-era political police. Indeed, in those countries, 
such as (as we shall see) Poland after the passage of the 1998 law - when access to security 
service files was granted to journalists, historians, researchers and some individuals - there 
was also a great deal of public identifications of former agents conducted by state and non-
state actors and ‘informal’ screening of individuals and groups not covered by procedures set 
down in lustration laws. Consequently, it is only by examining both lustration as a personnel 
and employment policy and the question of access to the communist-era security service files 
that one can properly get to grips with this issue in post-communist states. 
 
Poland: a case of late (and recurring) lustration and file access debates 
 
In Stan’s general typology of post-communist states’ approaches to transitional justice - 
based on whether they instituted court proceedings against former communist regime 
functionaries, as well as their enactment of lustration laws and access to communist security 
service archives - Poland was (along with Hungary) classified as a ‘mild’ case. In such 
countries, transitional justice was both delayed in time and less radical in scope than those 
that, to a greater or lesser extent, pursued all three of these processes strongly and vigorously 
through citizenship and electoral as well as screening laws (such as the former GDR, the 
Czech Republic and the Baltic states) but more advanced than those countries that adopted 
weak approaches to transitional justice with only one or two of the methods outlined (such as 
Bulgaria and Romania) or those that resisted attempts to re-evaluate the past and seemingly 
followed a ‘forgive and forget’ approach (such as Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania and all of the 
Soviet successor republics except for the Baltic states).
15
 
 
In Poland, the revelation of links between persons holding public office and the former 
communist secret police by lustration and file access was by far the most extensively used 
transitional justice mechanism, much more so than trials or compensation of victims of 
communist rule. While it was the first country in the region to overthrow communism, as a 
result of peaceful negotiations between the outgoing regime and former opposition, it was 
more than eight years after the transition to democracy began that Poland finally approved a 
lustration law. Despite various attempts to pass lustration laws in the early-to-mid 1990s, a 
                                                          
13
 Bertschi also makes this distinction where he defines de-communisation (along with de-Stalinisation, de-
partyization and de-idolization) as ‘(a) transformational process(es) that pertains more to institutions and social 
structures than people’. See: C. Charles Bertschi, ‘Lustration and the Transition to Democracy: The Cases of 
Poland and Bulgaria’, East European Quarterly, Vol 28, No 4, Winter 1995, pp435-451 (437). Kaminski and 
Nalepa also make this distinction, arguing that de-communisation was analogous to de-Nazification in post-war 
Germany in the sense that it denoted ‘purging the state’s administration and bureaucracy of high ranking 
communist (or Nazi) officials’ and, unlike in lustration, the identity of a high-ranking communist (or Nazi) 
official was common knowledge so they were not vulnerable to blackmail in the same way as the former 
undercover agent. See: ‘Judging Transitional Justice’, p384. 
14
 See: Roman David, Lustration and Transitional Justice: Personnel Systems in the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
15
 See: Lavinia Stan, ‘Conclusion: Explaining country differences’ in Lavinia Stan, ed, Transitional Justice in 
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, Routledge: London and New York, 2009, pp247-270 (261-262). 
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formalised lustration programme came late to Poland with the law only being passed in 1997, 
file access legislation approved in 1998, and the two only becoming operational in 1999 and 
2000 respectively following further amendments. However, one of the most striking things 
about the Polish case was the on-going politicisation of the lustration issue with communist 
security service secret archives generating a number of public scandals which, as we shall see, 
contributed to the collapse of two governments. Indeed, David argues that it was precisely 
due to the length of the pre-lustration period that Polish discourses on this issue developed 
such a ‘poisonous’ character. 16  Poland is thus an interesting case of ‘late and recurring 
lustration’: moving away from an initial communist-forgiving approach to a functioning mild 
lustration law and communist security file access finally taking effect and being enforced at 
the end of the 1990s, and then to a more radical lustration and file access law being passed 
(although not fully enacted) in 2007. It is this significant delay and recurrence of the issue 
that is one of the most striking features of the development of lustration in Poland and one 
that needs explanation and analysis. 
 
In August 1989, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a Catholic intellectual advisor to the Solidarity 
opposition movement and the first non-communist prime minister in Poland since the country 
was incorporated into the Soviet bloc at the end of the 1940s, announced that a ‘thick line’ 
would be drawn between the past and present. Although he was actually seeking to distance 
his government from the damage done to the national economy by the previous regime, the 
‘thick line’ was often cited as a metaphor epitomising the lenient approach to the communist 
regime adopted by his administration. However, in spite of these attempts to ‘forgive and 
forget’ by both the Mazowiecki government and subsequent post-Solidarity government led 
by Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (who took over when Mr Mazowiecki resigned as prime minister 
following his defeat in the November-December 1990 presidential election) the issue of 
dealing with the communist past did not go away. Moreover, although Poland refrained from 
systematically verifying whether persons holding or running for public office had 
collaborated with the communist secret Security Service (Służba Bezpieczeństwa: SB), the 
issue of secret police files gained notoriety in the years prior to the initiation of a formal 
lustration programme and public identifications of former agents conducted by state and non-
state actors and ‘informal’ screening of individuals and groups not covered by procedures set 
down in lustration laws occurred on many occasions to discredit political opponents. 
 
Following the first fully free parliamentary election held in October 1991, a right-wing 
administration led by the Solidarity-linked lawyer Jan Olszewski came to office as a self-
proclaimed government of ‘breakthrough’. Although it was always a weak and unstable 
minority coalition, Mr Olszewski’s government had huge political ambitions and promised a 
clean break with both the communist past and the communist-forgiving policy of the two 
previous cabinets. Consequently, in May 1992 the Sejm, the more powerful lower house of 
the Polish parliament, voted by 186 votes to 15 (with 32 abstentions) in favour of a resolution 
proposed by Janusz Korwin-Mikke from the small liberal-conservative Union of Real Politics 
(Unia Polityki Realnej: UPR) party requiring the then interior minister, Antoni Macierewicz, 
to publicly disclose within twenty one days the names of all current senior public officials 
occupying the rank of provincial governor upwards who had collaborated with the communist 
security services. However, because the motion had been neither channelled through the 
relevant parliamentary committees nor debated in a plenary session, Mr Macierewicz was not 
                                                          
16
 See: ‘Lustration Laws in Action’, p418. 
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provided with any guidelines on how this objective should be achieved.
17
 Consequently, a 
special investigation bureau was established within the interior ministry to compile a list of 
collaborators based on the secret archives and, on June 4th, Mr Macierewicz presented 
parliament and the then President Lech Wałęsa with secret lists of 66 leading public officials 
who had allegedly figured in the communist security service archives as informers. The list 
included Mr Wałęsa, who led the Solidarity trade union from its formation at the beginning of 
the 1980s through to the democratic transition, and other former anti-communist opposition 
activists, including those who had previously advocated lustration such as: Wiesław 
Chrzanowski, the speaker of the Sejm and leader of the post-Solidarity clerical-nationalist 
Christian-National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe: ZChN) party and Leszek 
Moczulski, the leader of the radical anti-communist Confederation for an Independent Poland 
(Konfedracja Polski Niepodległej: KPN).18 However, these ‘secret lists’ were immediately 
leaked to the press and the next day (June 5th), Mr Olszewski’s government was dismissed 
by 273 votes to 119 (with 33 abstentions) among hints from the prime minister that it had 
fallen victim to a conspiracy by dark political forces linked to the previous regime.
19
 
 
Nonetheless, although the controversy that ensued from this failed attempt to introduce 
lustration was widely felt to have discredited the entire process, the issue did not go away. 
For sure, none of the various draft lustration laws that were presented during the remainder of 
the 1991-93 and start of the 1993-1997 parliaments made any progress. Indeed, the 1993 
parliamentary election - which brought the communist successor Democratic Left Alliance 
(Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej: SLD) and the Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stonnictwo 
Ludowe: PSL), another regime-successor grouping, to government - followed by the 1995 
presidential election, where Alliance leader Aleksander Kwaśniewski defeated Mr Wałęsa, 
suggested that the issue of how to deal with the communist past was being suppressed and 
moving to the bottom, if not completely off, the political agenda. However, at the end of 1995 
outgoing President Wałęsa and his interior minister Andrzej Milczanowski warned that 
Poland’s security was endangered by Democratic Left Alliance prime minister Józef Oleksy, 
whom they claimed had been (and still was) a Russian spy who had passed on secret 
documents to a KGB agent. Although Mr Oleksy declared his innocence, and military 
prosecutors later dismissed the charges, he was forced to step down as prime minister in April 
1996. 
 
The so-called ‘Oleksy affair’ meant that the call to tackle the legacy of the former secret 
police began to gradually dominate political debate and this was echoed in parliament, setting 
off a chain of events that culminated in the passage of a lustration law in April 1997.
20
 The 
Sejm adopted a proposal sponsored by a three-party coalition comprising the governing 
Peasant Party and two post-Solidarity opposition parties: the liberal centrist Freedom Union 
(Unia Wolności: UW) and social democratic Labour Union (Unia Pracy: UP). The new law 
contained a number of provisions. Firstly, all elected state officials from the rank of deputy 
provincial governor up to ministers, prime minister and the President, parliamentary 
candidates, barristers, judges, prosecutors and leading figures in the public mass media 
(approximately 20,000 individuals in total) were required to submit written declarations 
stating whether or not they consciously worked for or collaborated with the communist 
                                                          
17
 See: Skeletons in Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe, p15. 
18
 See: Y-Elita Pl, ‘Lista Macierericza’, undated, available at: http://yelita.pl/artykuly/art/lista-macierewicza 
(accessed December 16, 2013). 
19
 See: Jacek Kurski and Piotr Semka, Lewy Czerwcowy, Warsaw: Editions Spotkania, 1993. 
20
 See: ‘Dealing with the Communist Past or the Politics of the Present?’. 
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security services at any point from 1944-1990.
21
 Secondly, all statements denying 
collaboration were transferred to a state prosecutor, the Public Interest Spokesman (Rzecznik 
Interesu Publicznego: RIP), who used the communist security service secret archives to 
assess their accuracy. Thirdly, if the prosecutor found evidence that the declaration was false, 
the public official was to be tried before a lustration court. Fourthly, office holders or 
candidates for office who made false statements were banned from public office for ten years. 
Fifthly, verdicts could be appealed but the appeal court’s rulings were binding and anyone 
found guilty of being a ‘lustration liar’ had to resign immediately upon it making judgement 
(although the lustration process could be re-opened subsequently if the Supreme Court 
overturned the decision of the appeal court). President Kwaśniewski was dissatisfied with the 
lustration bill because it did not define collaboration narrowly enough for him
22
 nor did it 
offer all citizens access to their communist security service files.
23
 Nonetheless, he did not 
veto the lustration bill and signed it into law immediately prior to the 1997 parliamentary 
election. 
 
However, due to organisational difficulties in establishing the lustration court the process did 
not actually take effect until 1999. The problem of finding twenty one judges willing to 
conduct lustration trials and be involved in passing such sensitive moral and political 
judgements (only eleven had agreed to do so) was solved, and the lustration law was made 
workable, following the election in September 1997 of the right-wing Solidarity Electoral 
Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność: AWS) grouping which formed a coalition government 
with the Freedom Union. In June 1998, to circumvent the problem of finding willing judges 
the Sejm amended the lustration law so that the Warsaw District Appeal Court was 
recognised as the lustration court. The 1998 amendments also strengthened the law, 
transforming the lustration prosecutor (now appointed by the head of the Supreme Court) 
from being simply the government’s representatives to a key figure conducting the process, 
and allowing MPs to initiate lustration trials directly themselves through the so-called 
‘parliamentary denunciation’, whereby they could demand the investigation of particular 
individuals. 
 
Nalepa, who distinguishes between two types of lustration system, categorised the Polish law 
as an example of a so-called ‘confession-based truth revelation procedure’ (CTR) that gave 
the target of lustration a chance to self-report before any charges were presented by a 
prosecutor.
24
 Confession-based lustration thus only targeted collaboration with the 
communist regime as an informer or agent that was kept secret from the public, not the open 
membership or leadership in the communist party. Other examples of these kinds of systems 
were Estonia, Lithuania and Romania. Nalepa distinguishes these from ‘accusation-based 
truth revelation procedures’ (ATRs) that made specific accusations relying on evidence of 
collaboration with the former regime from archival and other sources. Examples of these 
kinds of systems included: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
                                                          
21
 As clarified subsequently by the Constitutional Court, collaboration had to be conscious, secret and connected 
to the security services’ operational activities. A declaration of intent was not enough, there had to be proof of 
actual activities undertaken in the form of information reports. 
22
 For example, he wanted it to exclude military intelligence and counter-intelligence, which were the 
communist-era security services that his erstwhile Democratic Left Alliance colleagues were most likely to have 
collaborated with. 
23
 Which critics argue that Mr Kwaśniewski wanted to allow so that former security service operatives would 
have the opportunity to view what had been retained about their activities in their files and, more generally, it 
would make the law un-workable. 
24
 See: ‘To Punish the Guilty and Protect the Innocent’. 
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According to his typology of what he terms ‘lustration systems’, David,25 on the other hand, 
classifies the Polish model as an example of a reconciliatory system, which institutionalised 
forgiveness and gave those in public employment a second chance; or rather, semi-
reconciliatory because, while it resembled the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
process (which exchanged amnesty of perpetrators for truth) in so far as the Polish law 
facilitated the access of collaborators to leading public offices in exchange for disclosure, it 
did not provide a wider forum for the country to come to terms with the past, thus also 
performing a reconciliatory function.
26
 However, in contrast to simple inclusive systems, 
whereby a public official could, under certain circumstances (generally a bargain to exchange 
the retention of public office for the revelation of truth about their past) or their own election, 
remain in their position despite past collaborations,
27
 in the Polish semi-reconciliatory system 
a person could only remain in office under condition of demonstrating a change in their 
behaviour by making inclusion conditional upon the individual’s own public revelation of 
past collaboration.
28
 
 
At the end of 1998, the Solidarity Election Action-dominated parliament also voted to 
establish the Institute for National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej: IPN) which, 
apart from investigating Nazi and communist crimes and informing and educating the Polish 
public about the country’s recent past, was set up as the custodian of the communist security 
service files. The 1998 law granted researchers, journalists and historians access to the secret 
archives as well as giving citizens who had been victims of secret police invigilation access 
to their own files. Those who were not felt to be victims of communist persecution or worked 
as informers for, or collaborators with, the communist security services (even if they had 
themselves been spied upon) could not have access to their files.
29
 However, like the 1997 
lustration law the implementation of this file access legislation was delayed following 
difficulties in agreeing a procedure to elect, and then identifying a suitable candidate to act as, 
its chairman, and did not actually being functioning properly until 2000. 
 
                                                          
25
 See: Roman David, ‘From Prague to Baghdad: Lustration Systems and their Political Effects’, Government 
and Opposition, Vol 41 No 3, June 2006, 347-372; Lustration and Transitional Justice. 
26
 See: ‘From Prague to Baghdad’, p360. However, in later work he argues that the Polish system should be 
described as simply ‘reconciliatory’. See: Lustration and Transitional Justice, ppxi-xii. For more on the 
similarities and differences between the Polish and South African models, see: Roman David, ‘In Exchange for 
Truth: The Polish Lustrations and the South African Amnesty Process’, Polittikon, Vol 31 No 1, April 2006, 
pp81-99. 
27
 The model that was, according to David, adopted in Hungary (1994), Romania (1999) and partly in Serbia 
(2003). See: ‘From Prague to Baghdad’, pp357-359. 
28
 According to David, the two other kinds of lustration systems were: exclusive systems, where a public official 
associated with particular departments or activities in the former regime was excluded automatically from 
certain state positions posts in the new administration (adopted in Czechoslovakia in 1991, and subsequently the 
Czech Republic, Bulgaria in 1992, Albania in 1993 and, for some high-ranking public officials, in Serbia in 
2003); and mixed systems that gave an opportunity to adopt any or all of the other three strategies, deciding on a 
case-by-case basis whether that a person would receive tenure or not (adopted in the former GDR following 
German re-unification). See: ‘From Prague to Baghdad’, pp354-357, 361-363. In his later classification of 
‘personnel systems’ (of which ‘lustration systems’ were an East European regional variant) David also adds the 
category of ‘systems of continuation’ in which he locates Slovenia and (pre-lustration) Poland. See: Lustration 
and Transitional Justice, pp31-32. 
29
 See: Sejm RP, Ustawa z dnia 18 grudnia 1998 r. o Instytucie Pamięci Narodowej-Komisji Ścigania Zbrodni 
przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, Dziennik Ustaw, 1998 nr 155 poz. 1016. 
http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download;jsessionid=CA1405B658D079ABB3B206BFD076EBF0?id=WDU199815510
16&type=2 (accessed 20 February 2014).  
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Following the 2001 parliamentary election that brought the Democratic Left Alliance back to 
office once again in coalition with the Peasant Party, there were various on-going attempts to 
weaken and narrow the scope of the lustration law. These focused mainly on: excluding those 
who worked for military intelligence and counter-intelligence from its provisions; and 
defining the scope of collaboration more narrowly so that it only encompassed conscious 
collaboration with the intention of providing information damaging to the Church, 
independent trade unions, the underground opposition or the Polish nation, or participation in 
actions that threatened the civil liberties or properties of others. However, all of these 
amendments were unsuccessful, although it was agreed to scrap the ‘parliamentary 
denunciation’ provisions. 
 
At the same time, other developments during the 2001-5 parliament once again brought the 
issues of lustration and communist security service file access to the fore and led to calls for 
strengthening existing lustration laws and truth revelation procedures or introducing more 
radical ones. Firstly, calls for more radical lustration became linked to the fight against 
political corruption, which became a more salient issue in Poland following the emergence of 
the so-called ‘Rywin affair’ at the end of 2002. Lew Rywin, a film producer, offered Adam 
Michnik (a veteran anti-communist opposition strategist but who in post-communist Poland 
became proprietor of the Agora media empire that published the influential liberal daily 
‘Gazeta Wyborcza’, of which Mr Michnik was founder and editor-in-chief) that, in exchange 
for a bribe, he would arrange for a change in a draft law aimed at limiting the print media's 
influence on radio and television. Mr Rywin claimed that he was acting on behalf of what he 
called the ‘group in power’ which wanted to remain anonymous but possibly included the 
then prime minister and Democratic Left Alliance leader Leszek Miller. The Rywin affair 
was followed by a raft of further scandalous revelations involving politicians and officials 
from the ruling party, which meant that the corruption issue moved to the top of the political 
agenda. These scandals were felt to exemplify the corrupt and croneyistic network that had 
allegedly colonised Polish capitalism and led to calls for more radical lustration and 
revelation of former communist security service networks as a means of breaking this corrupt 
nexus.  
 
Secondly, the very act of opening up the communist security service files by the Institute of 
National Remembrance led to pressure for further truth revelation procedures. For example, 
in February 2005 the allegedly slow pace at which the Institute’s files were being made 
available, and its apparent failure to fulfil its mandate and publicly name secret agents, 
prompted journalist Bronisław Wildstein to disclose a ‘working’ list of 240,000 persons on 
whom secret files existed (including former agents, military intelligence, secret informers, 
prospective candidates for informers, and victims) and to post it on the Internet. The list 
contained no information on whether those named were victims or informers and no details 
regarding their date of birth or place of residence that would identify them. As well as leading 
to heavy criticisms of the Institute for allowing such a security breach, the publication of the 
‘Wildstein list’ also increased pressure on the Polish authorities to open up the communist 
security service secret archives more widely.
30
 
 
Thirdly, calls for further lustration and file access were also spurred on by the emergence of 
links between prominent Catholic clergymen and the communist security services. These 
                                                          
30
 See: ‘To nie jest lista agentów,’ Rzeczpospolita, January 31, 2005; Agnieszka Kublik and Wojciech 
Czuchnowski, “Wildstein wyniósł listę 240,000 nazwisk z IPN,” Gazeta.pl, January 31, 2005, available at 
http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/kraj/2029020,34317,2520547.html (accessed January 31, 2005). 
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began with the revelation by the Institute of National Remembrance in April 2005 that Father 
Konrad Hejmo, an acquaintance of Pope John Paul II who for 20 years was the main link 
between the Polish-born pontiff and Polish pilgrims visiting Rome, had been a communist 
spy. At a press conference, the Institute's director Leon Kieres said that it had proof that 
Father Hejmo, a Dominican monk, had collaborated with the Polish communist secret police 
in the 1980s under the names codenames ‘Hejnal’ and ‘Dominik’.31 News of the allegations 
broke at a time when Poles were still mourning Pope John Paul II who had died three weeks 
earlier and Father Hejmo had played a central role organising the pilgrimage of up to one 
million Poles who flocked to Rome for the former pontiff’s funeral. A series of further 
revelations about links between Catholic clergymen and the communist security services 
followed, peaking in January 2007 when the Archbishop of Warsaw Stanisław Wielgus 
resigned a few days as after his consecration (but immediately prior to his public investiture) 
following revelations in the Institute’s files about his collaboration with the communist 
security services, which he had initially denied.
32
  
 
Following the election of a government led by the right-wing Law and Justice (Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość: PiS) party in 2005, the Polish parliament passed a series of amendments - 
firstly at the end of 2006 and then, in a revised version after the President Lech Kaczyński 
refused to approve the original, at the beginning of 2007 - which led to a radical expansion of 
the scope of the lustration law; although the legislation on this issue was also supported by 
the centre-right (although evolving in an increasingly centrist direction) Civic Platform 
(Platforma Obywatelska: PO), the main opposition party. It was felt that the provisions of the 
previous law, whereby during lustration proceedings the Public Interest Spokesman 
conducted the initial screening and then directed questions to the Institute of National 
Remembrance, slowed the lustration process down too much. Under the new law, in order to 
streamline the verification process, the Spokesman’s office was abolished and replaced by a 
special lustration department within the Institute that determined which declarations raised 
suspicion and warranted investigation. The new lustration law, which came into force in 
March 2007, also broadened existing rules on disclosing collaboration to include all ‘people 
filling a public function’ requiring up to an estimated 700,000 individuals (including, for the 
first time, teachers, academics and journalists) to declare if they were communist security 
service informants.
33
  
 
However, in May 2007 the Polish Constitutional Tribunal gutted the new provisions when it 
ruled that large sections of the amended law violated Poland’s constitution. Firstly, it ruled 
that the definition of who held public offices was too broad and should not include academics, 
journalists, bank and stock exchange managers, tax advisers, school heads, managers of 
sports organisation and those who worked for private enterprises. Secondly, it struck down 
provisions that, it argued, defined the state security organs too broadly. Thirdly, it annulled 
penalties for failure to submit a lustration declaration. Fourthly, it banned the publication of a 
list of so-called ‘secret collaborators’(Tajni Współpracownicy: TWs) and ‘operational links’ 
                                                          
31
 See: Andrzej Kaczyński, Ewa K. Czaczkowska and Paweł Siennecki, ‘Donosił z Wiecznego Miasta’, 
Rzeczpospolita, April 28, 2005. 
32
 See: Tomasz P. Terlikowski, ‘Arcybiskup Stanisław Wielgus był agentem wywiadu PRL’, Rzeczpospolita, 
January 4, 2007. 
33
 See: IPN, Ustawa z dnia 18 paźdiernika 2006r o ujawnianiu informacji o dokumentach organów 
bezpieczeństwa z lat 1944-1990 oraz treści tych dokumentów, 2007, available at: 
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‘Polish witch-hunt “risks business chaos”,’ Financial Times, March 14, 2007. 
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(Kontakti Operacyjni: KOs).
34
 Fifthly, it limited the Institute of National Remembrance 
chairman’s discretion as to whether or not he could withhold access to files from journalists 
or academics. However, the Tribunal did not question the provisions for lustrating candidates 
for senior office nor those that required the loss of office for anyone found to be submitting a 
false declaration and, as Nalepa put it, ‘even with the provisions struck down by the Tribunal, 
the Institute still expanded its powers compared to what they were under the 1997 law’.35 
 
After 2007, the issue of lustration and file access became less salient in Polish politics. One 
might argue that this was inevitable given passage of time since the collapse of communism. 
However, it was also because the Constitutional Tribunal’s gutting of the new legislation 
created confusion as to what the new law’s precise provisions were, together with the fact 
that, in the snap parliamentary election held in the autumn of that year, Civic Platform ousted 
the Law and Justice party from government. Civic Platform had supported the 2006-7 
lustration law amendments and, if anything, had actually adopted a more radical policy 
towards file access in the run up to the 2005 parliamentary election when more right-wing 
conservative elements within the party were in the ascendant. However, at the same time the 
party increasingly downplayed the issue as part of a conscious effort to reach an 
accommodation with the liberal-left Polish cultural and media establishment which had 
always been extremely wary of, and in some cases openly hostile to, radical lustration and 
file access.  
 
Nonetheless, lustration and communist security service file access retained their capacity to 
flare up as major political issues. For example, in 2008 the Institute of National 
Remembrance was criticised for publishing a book by two historians, (Sławomir Cenckiewicz 
and Piotr Gontarczyk) who suggested that Lech Wałęsa had been a communist security 
service informer in the early 1970s (discussed in more detail below).
36
 Among its other 
effects, the political debates surrounding the publication of this book led to a 2010 
amendment to the law regulating the work of the Institute which the Civic Platform-led 
government hoped would make it easier to replace its chairman, Janusz Kurtyka,
 37
 who was 
heavily criticised by the anti-lustration liberal-left media for allegedly being too closely 
politically aligned with the Law and Justice party (although Mr Kurtyka actually died 
tragically in the April 2010 Smolensk air crash before the law took effect). 
 
Explaining the Polish case using prior communist regime and transition frameworks 
 
A large and growing number of scholars have attempted to develop comparative explanatory 
frameworks to analyse why and how the newly emerging democracies of central and Eastern 
                                                          
34
 Secret collaborator was the operational name for those individuals who collaborated consciously with the 
communist security services from 1957-1990. Operational link was a special category of collaborators with 
simplified recruitment procedures created in the 1970s when the security services stepped up its goal of 
infiltrating the dissident movement. Most of these were conscious collaborators but, due to simplified 
recruitment procedures, some of them (those drawn from the communist party and its satellites) may not have 
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2008. 
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Europe have chosen to come to terms with their communist past and whether or not they 
attempted to secure some kind of historical justice. Many of these have tried to explain: why 
some countries have dealt with the issue more promptly and decisively than others; why truth 
revelation procedures such as lustration and file access were pursued; and, where they were, 
why more or less radical methods of transitional justice were adopted. All of them have 
attempted to explain variations in country differences through examining factors such as: the 
nature of their dictatorial past and the injustices that their people’s suffered, the legitimacy of 
the dictatorial and post-communist democratic regimes, the type of exit from dictatorship to 
democracy, and the balance of power between - and different strategic and ideological 
motives driving - old and new elites, particularly during the first stages of democratisation. 
How can the Polish case be located within the current literature and to what extent do these 
explanatory frameworks help us to understand it? 
 
In the broader transitional justice literature, authors such as Elster
38
 and Nino
39
 have argued 
that the demand for prosecutions of functionaries linked to the previous regime would be 
greater where citizens faced gross, widespread human rights abuses and where these crimes 
were committed recently, than where they cost fewer lives and were committed long ago. In 
line with these arguments, some authors argue that the scope of the transitional justice 
programmes in post-communist states depends on structural factors such as the nature of the 
previous communist regime and the injustices that it inflicted. Moran, for example, argues 
that the intensity of transitional justice depended upon the nature of the former communist 
regime: how liberal it was and how much scope there was for expressing dissent and 
tolerating emigration; what he conceptualised as ‘the psychological variables of “exit” and 
“voice”’.40 If a regime did not allow citizens the opportunity to voice discontent there would 
be more pressure for the settling of scores and former regime functionaries faced an 
‘explosive situation’ as the anger produced by repression was channelled into vengeance. 
However, if a country allowed its citizens some scope for self-organisation and protest, or 
permitted emigration as an alternative ‘pressure release’, there would, he argued, be little 
desire for retribution. 
 
Moran’s empirical case studies were Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the GDR and he did not 
examine the Polish case in any detail. The communist regime in Poland was a relatively 
liberal one that allowed its citizens some scope for dissent and protest.
41
 In his comparative 
typology of communist regimes, for example, Kitschelt categorises Poland alongside 
Hungary in the more liberal ‘national-accommodative’ category.42 Indeed, in their typology 
of all non-democratic regimes (not just communist ones) Linz and Stepan argue that Poland 
was the only former communist state that never actually experienced a period of totalitarian 
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rule and, therefore, place it in the milder ‘authoritarian’ rather than the ‘post-totalitarian’ 
category.
43
 Consequently, Moran argues that in a country like Poland (and Hungary) ‘where 
exit and/or voice were allowed by the former regime’ there would be a ‘tendency to forgive 
and forget’.44 On the basis of his model, therefore, one would have expected Poland not to 
have to pursued a policy of radical lustration whereas, of course, although it did indeed 
initially adopt a relatively ‘communist forgiving’ approach, the issue re-surfaced until 
lustration and file access laws were passed and then strengthened and their scope widened. 
 
Other authors, notably Huntington, argue that ‘justice was a function of political power’ and 
attempt to find a predictive link between the new regime’s policy towards dealing with 
previous non-democratic leaders and the type of transition that a society underwent in its 
efforts to democratise, particularly the role of elite bargains in the ‘mode of exit’ from 
authoritarianism to democracy.
45
 Writing in a seminal book on the so-called ‘third wave’ of 
democratisation at the beginning of the 1990s as the Central and East European revolutions 
were just beginning (and, therefore, at something of a disadvantage to other analysts given 
the short time span that he was able to investigate) and focusing on the actions taken against 
communist leaders in a small number of cases, Huntington extrapolates from other regions’ 
experiences to try and explain and predict what would be the outcome of what he terms ‘the 
torturer problem’. According to Huntington, if the last leaders of the non-democratic regime 
did not go willingly or had to be overthrown by revolutionary forces, a mode of exit that he 
termed transition by ‘replacement’, there would be a desire for retribution and officials in 
these regimes would be in no position to demand any kind of amnesty. If such leaders 
participated willingly in the democratisation process and gave up peacefully following revolts, 
so-called ‘transplacements’ (a process which often involved amnesty as part of the negotiated 
transition), or initiated reform themselves and stepped down once those reforms went beyond 
their initial intentions, so-called ‘transformations’, they were able to declare amnesties to 
protect their positions. Thus, the more broadly society was implicated alongside the regime in 
its injustices the less likely it was that former regime officials would be held accountable for 
their previous actions in the new democracy. On the other hand, the weaker an authoritarian 
regime was at the time of the transfer of power to democratic forces, the more likely officials 
and collaborators would be held accountable for their acts of oppression. According to 
Huntington’s predictions based on transition type, therefore, only East European countries 
where the intransigent communist officials were replaced by new elites (transition by 
replacement), such as Romania and the GDR, would be likely to confront the past and enact 
transitional justice legislation, prosecuting and punishing former communist regime officials 
and secret agents. Looking around Central and Eastern Europe, therefore, Huntington saw an 
‘initial overall tendency’ to forgive and forget.46 
 
Nonetheless, in spite of the criticisms that Huntington encountered fairly soon after his book 
was published, his approach of trying to explain patterns of variation by the nature of the 
democratic transition was adopted by several authors working on this broad topic, either 
implicitly or explicitly. For example, without acknowledging Huntington explicitly, Bertschi 
argues that, ‘(t)he method of transition of power in many ways conditioned the course of 
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future lustration attempts’. Thus ‘genuinely revolutionary transfers’ of power led to ‘more 
retribution and a stronger will to pursue elements of the old regime’, while cases of brokered 
or negotiation transitions, such as Poland, were less likely to lead to a wholesale purge.
47
 
Similarly, but drawing more explicitly on Huntington’s framework, David argues that 
transition type was the main causal driver of ‘the substance and shape’ of transitional justice 
measures in a particular country
48
 - and, subsequently, the origin of the four ‘lustration 
systems’ that he went on to develop. 49 David sets out in detail a model that links a country’s 
mechanisms for dealing with the past with Huntington’s modes of exit of the authoritarian 
regime so that if old elites were defeated new leaders would be able to determine transitional 
justice un-impeded but if the transition was negotiated, as in Poland, the new leaders would 
face ‘political and structural constraints that undermined or obstructed any serious attempt to 
deal with the past’. 50  Making a similar argument, Appel cites the speed with which 
communism was dismantled as a possible explanatory factor for the intensity of what she 
terms ‘anti-communist programmes’. The greater rigidity of the orthodox communist 
regimes, she argues, meant that they collapsed suddenly compared to those countries such as 
Poland where political and economic change emerged gradually in the 1980s with the aid or 
acquiescence of former communists so that communist leaders in these countries gained 
legitimacy as they embraced democratic and capitalist change.
51
 
 
As with approaches based on the nature of the previous regime, the transition-type model, 
therefore, also suggests that Poland should have been a relatively ‘communist forgiving’ state 
and not pursued a policy of radical lustration and de-communisation. The transition to 
democracy in Poland was a negotiated one, an example of what Huntington terms a 
‘transplacement’ with the last communist leaders initiating reform themselves and then 
stepping down once those reforms went beyond their initial intentions.
52
 As a result of the so-
called ‘round table’ negotiations held in February-April 1989 between the communist Polish 
United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza: PZPR) and the Solidarity 
democratic opposition, the regime agreed to allow 35% of the seats in the Sejm to be 
contested. They also agreed to the formation of a less powerful but freely elected second 
chamber, the Senate. In fact, the communists were trounced in the ‘semi-free’ elections that 
were held in May–June 1989 with Solidarity winning all of the 161 contested Sejm seats and 
99 out of 100 of the Senate seats.
53
 On their own, the communists only held 38% of the seats 
in the new Sejm and the subsequent defection of their erstwhile allies in the so-called 
‘satellite’ parties deprived them of a parliamentary majority and the ability to form a 
government. In August 1989, therefore, Tadeusz Mazowiecki was, as noted above, confirmed 
as the first non-communist premier in post-war Poland heading up a government in which the 
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communists were in a minority. Calhoun argues that the round table negotiations ‘created a 
climate where the opposition acknowledged the communists as legitimate partners in building 
a democratic state’ and by surrendering power peacefully, the latter ‘earned the moral right to 
participate in the country’s democratic politics’.54 In so far as it was ever on the political 
agenda, the transitional justice issue should, therefore, have faded away fairly quickly. 
 
Transition theories such as Huntington’s were, therefore, quite helpful in predicting that 
Poland’s new Solidarity-led democratic government would put the past behind it and focus 
on building the future, explaining why it chose not to pursue lustration in the months after the 
1989 semi-free election. However, the key problem with these accounts, as with all those 
frameworks that try and explain such phenomena through historical and structural factors, is 
that, although they may account successfully for the lack of an early interest in lustration and 
pursuit of transitional justice in countries such as Poland, they are too static and have 
problems in accounting for and explaining what might have made the issue arise subsequently 
and the often quite radical changes of trajectory in the way that they dealt with it. This 
recurrence or ‘meandering path’ that lustration and transition justice sometimes take55 flatly 
contradicts Huntington’s prediction that the politics of transitional justice could only be 
pursued during a limited window immediately following the transition democracy.
56
 As 
Nalepa points out theories such as Huntington’s were derived from explanatory approaches 
based on politicians responding to electoral demand and echoed other, broader accounts of 
transitional justice in other contexts.
57
 As noted above, these argued that public support for 
dealing with past oppressors was strongest immediately after the transition and that the other 
pressing issues confronting post-transition governments would dampen further demands for 
post-authoritarian retribution. However, by predicting that former autocrats would be held to 
account in the immediate aftermath of the transition or not at all, such theories failed to 
account for the specific timing of lustration in much of Central and Eastern Europe; including 
its late emergence in Poland. 
 
Explaining recurrence through the ‘politics of the present’ 
 
So what are the possible explanations for the recurrence of lustration and file access as issues 
in post-communist Poland? And how can examining the Polish case tell us more about 
lustration, transitional justice and post-communist politics in general, both in Poland and 
other central and East European states? It may of course simply have been the case that if a 
country did not tackle this issue of how to deal with the communist past it simply came back 
to haunt them, regardless of whether they tried to be forward-looking and adopted a ‘forgive 
and forget’ approach. However, there have been a number of attempts to try and explain the 
recurrence of lustration and file access as issues in countries like Poland in a more systematic 
way.  
 
One of these is what might be termed the ‘politics of the present’ approach which stresses the 
role of post-communist party political competition as a key explanatory variable. For 
example, in a piece published in 1996, Welsh was one of the first analysts to make a crucial 
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distinction between those factors that accounted for an early pursuit of transitional justice and 
lustration and those that may make it arise as an issue subsequently.
58
 Welsh argues that 
instead of disappearing as time passed, as Huntington and others predicted, the issue could 
become even more salient if used by various post-communist politicians against their 
opponents in party competition. Like Moran and Huntington, Welsh recognises that nature of 
the previous communist regime - whether or not it remained consistently severe until its 
demise - and whether it was willing to negotiate and bargain the transition to democracy or 
resisted change until it was forced out were both critical explanatory factors. However, she 
posits a more intricate multi-casual model that recognises the potential importance of a range 
of different explanatory factors in various combinations at different times.  
 
Moreover, Welsh also factors in what she terms the ‘politics of the present’ which, she argues, 
was as important for determining a country’s willingness to push ahead with transitional 
justice as the ‘politics of the past’. Central to this was early elite turnover, particularly the 
balance of power between the new political elites drawn from former dissident anti-
communist circles who were willing to enact transitional justice measures, and the old elites 
who blocked efforts to deal with the communist past. Welsh focuses particularly on the 
question of whether or not the communists or their successor parties not only retained power 
during the transition but then also went on to perform well in (or rig) - and, therefore, 
remained in power after – the first free (or ‘founding’) elections which, for Welsh, was a 
proxy for the degree of elite turnover in the early post-communist period. Thus ‘the weaker 
the electoral strength of the former communists, the easier it has been to move ahead with de-
communisation efforts’.59 According to Welsh, therefore, the necessary and sufficient pre-
conditions for an early interest in lustration and a radical approach to dealing with the 
communist past were: the refusal of an orthodox communist regime to relax repression and 
bargain with the opposition until faced with mass protest and the communists’ loss of 
influence on the policy agenda after failing in ‘founding’ competitive elections.  
 
Precisely because the Polish transition was (as noted above) based on a high-level elite 
bargain and the May-June 1989 ‘founding’ election was only partially free, there was low 
elite turnover and the communists were able to retain both a number of key positions and a 
considerable influence in the new parliament. In addition to the sizeable bloc of communist 
deputies in the so-called ‘Contract Sejm’ (that lasted until the first fully free elections of 
October 1991), communist appointees retained control of defence and internal affairs, the so-
called ‘power’ ministries (and, therefore, of the army and the security services) until July 
1990 and former communist leader General Wojciech Jaruzelski held the post of President 
until December 1990. In other words, none of the conditions that were assumed to be 
necessary for an early interest in lustration and transitional justice were present during the 
first period of non-communist rule in Poland so, as predicted, the country did not initially 
pursue lustration, de-communisation or other radical forms of transitional justice. 
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However, citing Bertschi’s argument that ‘(w)hen political power is threatened the weapon of 
lustration can be wielded to gain sympathy and to quiet opposition’,60 Welsh goes on to argue 
that, as time passed, dealing with the communist past could become a tool in the struggle for 
political power and be exploited by some politicians to undermine their opponents, especially 
if former communists were able to reinvent themselves in the eyes of the public as they were 
in Poland and much of Central Europe. Drawing parallels with post-war France, Germany 
and Italy, Welsh argues that ‘the past does not simply disappear with the passage of time 
and…troubling questions do resurface’, also citing the case of post-authoritarian Argentina to 
show it can become ‘a central political commodity’.61 In the case of post-communist Central 
and Eastern Europe where former communists were able to rehabilitate themselves with the 
public, the issues of dealing with the past, she argues, ‘never cease to be instrumental in the 
struggle for political power’ and questions of how to deal with former communists and 
communist security service functionaries would ‘probably continue to resurface as a pawn in 
the struggle for political power’.62 Here Welsh builds on Bertschi’s argument, based on his 
analysis of the Polish (and Bulgarian) case, that power politics was the primary motivation 
for lustration. Bertschi argues that while the aims and motives of those who pursued 
lustration may have been to preclude the corrupt from continuing in power in the democratic 
era, the practice and methods used to implement it suggested that it had been ‘conjured to 
mask more common and base political goals’. Thus, for Bertschi, the ‘primary cause of the 
failure of lustration in Poland’ was that it ‘was wielded clumsily as a political weapon by 
Olszewski and Macierewicz.’ 63 
 
Given that it posits the possibility that the issue would not simply fade away with time, 
Welsh’s multi-causal model is certainly extremely useful in helping to explain how lustration 
evolved as a political issue in Poland and why the country belatedly adopted, and then 
strengthened, lustration and file access laws. However, Welsh does not go on to elaborate and 
discuss why and under what precise circumstances the lustration and file access issue was 
likely to recur and attitudes towards the communist past become instrumentalised as part of 
the political game, and why it was likely to do so in some countries rather than others. 
Welsh’s framework clearly requires some further elaboration here.  
 
In my own analysis of the how the 1997 Polish lustration law in Poland was passed (and 
amended in 1998),
64
 and in later co-authored, cross-country comparative papers (covering the 
Czech Republic and Hungary as well as Poland) with Williams and Fowler,
65
 I build and 
elaborate upon Welsh’s ‘politics of the present’ approach, by trying to identify the 
circumstances in which the lustration issue became instrumentalised in this way and by 
specifying the motives animating advocates of screening procedures. With my collaborators, 
I argue that, because of the pervasive networks of secret informers and the continuous 
political prominence of unrepentant communist leaders, many of the political divisions in the 
newly-democratising East European states were based upon attitudes towards the communist 
past which developed into an issue on which parties co-operated and competed. Our 
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conclusion is that the breakthrough that ensured the passage of lustration laws in Poland and 
elsewhere was achieved ‘through rhetorical devices that removed lustration from the context 
of transitional justice, and thus relieved it of the expectations that accompany and often 
paralyse conventional judicial approaches to the past’. 66  The discourse of lustration was 
convincing because it responded to major events of the transition such as: the discovery of 
chaos in the archives, the extent and possible survival of surveillance networks, the hardship 
and confusion caused by profound economic change, and the return of former communists to 
power. 
 
Lustration, we argue, resulted from: public scandals involving the security services, 
disillusionment with post-communist outcomes among elites, the political needs of the post-
communist right, the impact of earlier lustration efforts, or a public demand for information. 
Whereas Huntington and Moran believed that the past decided the timing and strength of 
transitional justice, we noted that none of the five sources of the demand for lustration had 
much to do with the nature of the preceding regime or the exit from it. The passage of each 
lustration bill, and the sanctions contained therein, similarly reflected not so much the 
country’s political history as: the parliamentary arithmetic of fluid party systems, trial and 
error, and learning from neighbours’ recent experiences. Building on Welsh’s argument that a 
key factor explaining the progress of transitional justice was the electoral strength of the 
former communists we, therefore, say that the variables determining lustration legislation in 
Central Europe were the differing access of former opposition groups to power and their 
ability to put together a coalition supportive of lustration. We also argue that the story of 
lustration was one of post-communist political competition and legislative coalition-building 
and should be told with emphasis on the rhetoric, moves and compromises that competition 
and coalitions required. The adoption of a lustration bill depended on the ability of its 
advocates among former anti-communist opposition politicians to put together a 
heterogeneous coalition supportive of lustration; if necessary by modification to secure a 
secure a parliamentary majority. 
 
Explaining recurrence through blending structural and post-communist factors 
 
Another approach to explaining the extent and recurrence of the lustration and transitional 
justice issue in countries like Poland involves trying to return to and refine historical-
structural and transition-type approaches, sometimes by supplementing and blending them 
with ‘politics of the present’ type explanations. For example, in a sophisticated account 
Nedelsky attempts to draw a link between the nature of the previous regime and later 
developments
67
 and, doing so, argues against Williams, Fowler and my claim that the 
dynamics of competition between the and new party elites over the lustration issue had ‘little 
to with the nature of the preceding communist regime’.68 She argues that the continuities in 
the various elites’ views of the previous regime from the communist to post-communist 
periods indicated that lustration debates and struggles over transitional justice issues should 
not be considered exclusively, or even primarily, ‘the politics of the present’ or as ‘the 
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politics of the past’ but rather that they were influenced by the legacy of communist regime-
society relations.
69
  
 
For Nedelsky, thus, the strongest determinant of the nature and level of transitional justice in 
a country was ‘the level of the preceding regime’s legitimacy as indicated during the 
communist period by levels of societal co-optation, opposition or internal exile and, during 
the post-communist period by levels of elite re-legitimation and public interest in “de-
communization”’. 70  The orientation of societal groups towards the previous communist 
regime was shaped by their experiences of it and this set the context for their response in both 
the communist and post-communist periods. Thus, Nedelsky claims, the ‘politics of the past 
and the politics of the present are linked’ in the sense that ‘the previous regime’s legitimacy 
is directly relevant to societal support for transitional justice because it addresses a central 
question: did the people find it unjust?’71 Nedelsky’s core theoretical assumption is, therefore 
that: ‘the extent and progress (of transitional justice) is at least partially shaped by the levels 
of the previous regime’s legitimacy’. 72 Thus, the higher the society’s view of the previous 
regime’s legitimacy, the less likely it is that the new elites will want to pursue transitional 
justice and the more likely it is that old elites will return quickly to political influence which, 
in turn, further reduces the likelihood of vigorous transitional justice. On the other hand, a 
lower view of the former regime’s legitimacy was likely to produce an anti-communist 
counter culture and electorally popular opposition counter-elites - who would, in turn, 
probably pursue a vigorous approach to dealing with the past.  
 
Nedelsky develops her framework by examining two cases, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
which, despite sharing a communist regime as part of Czechoslovakia, adopted different 
approaches to transitional justice once they became independent states (at least initially) as 
the Czechs continued with the radical Czechoslovak lustration law while the Slovaks left it to 
expire. She argues that the explanation for this lay in the fact that ‘the lower levels of regime 
repression in Slovakia both reflected and produced a higher level of (communist) regime 
legitimacy than existed in the Czech lands’ which ‘contributed to a lesser interest in 
transitional justice’73 and dis-satisfaction with early post-communist rule, while the Czechs 
attitudes towards the previous regime meant that they viewed the post-communist 
government as more legitimate.  
 
Nedelsky goes on to test her theory in countries with different kinds of communist regimes 
and applies her framework explicitly to Poland (as well as Hungary and Romania) to try and 
explain the extent of transitional justice that was applied. She argues that the Polish case 
displayed conflicting impulses as far as the legitimacy of the communist regime was 
concerned but that that it nonetheless tended to support her theory that this factor played a 
role in the post-communist lustration policy, so that ‘while various factors may have shaped 
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the outcome of power struggles, controversies over lustration reflect(ed) the legacy of 
regime-society conflicts of the communist past’. 74  On the one hand, Polish communist 
leaders’ ‘flexibility and willingness to reform during certain periods’ meant that the regime 
‘may not have engendered the depth of antipathy that more rigid and repressive ones’75 (such 
as the Czech) did and the communist successor party, the Democratic Left Alliance, was, as 
discussed above, able to re-establish its legitimacy fairly quickly and win elections. On the 
other hand, the breadth and depth of organised societal opposition to communism in Poland 
went far beyond anything experienced in the rest of the Soviet bloc so that not only was the 
regime ‘not highly legitimate’76 but ‘a very substantial anti-communist counter-elite existed 
in the country and, after the transition, it dominated positions of political influence for the 
first years in the post-communist period’ 77  and subsequently, in the form of Solidarity 
Electoral Action, defeated the communist successors electorally four years after they returned 
to office. This, she argued, produced a ‘”bi-polar tendency” with regard to “Communist-
purging” and “Communist-forgiving” orientations’78 which, she implied, was what led to the 
issue being contested and moving up and down the political agenda during the post-
communist period. 
 
Another attempt to try and blend historical-structural factors with ‘post-communist politics’-
type approaches came in a piece by Moran co-authored with Eva Jaskovska where with his 
collaborator, he develops a further iteration of his ‘psychological’ model, that they term the 
‘pressure cooker approach’.79 Although the empirical foci of their piece are the Baltic states, 
in developing the revised model Moran and Jaskovska acknowledge the shortcomings of his 
earlier explanatory framework by accepting that it did not conform to the empirical outcome 
in Poland. Moran and Jaskovska point out that Poland was, as discussed above, a 
‘transplacement’ country in terms of Huntington’s transition type in which ‘voice’ was 
allowed to be exercised during the communist period so should have adopted a forgiving 
orientation according to both psychological and transition-type explanations. However, 
Moran and Jaskovska acknowledge that the ‘perennially paradoxical’ Polish case represented 
a ‘significant anomaly’ for both of these explanatory models given that, as discussed above, 
the country enacted lustration laws in which former communist security service agents were 
subject to screening procedures.
80
 
 
In the revised iteration of the psychological model, Moran and Jaskovska argue that his 
original pressure cooker analogy still provided the best point of departure for identifying the 
determinants of post-communist transitional justice and return to the ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ 
themes in his earlier approach. However, in addition they also posit three possible additional 
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‘release valves’ from the post-communist period, namely: the high political legitimacy of the 
previous communist regime (acknowledging Nedelsky); the replacement of communism by 
nationalism as the dominant form of political legitimacy in the post-communist period (as 
was seen in, for example, the former Yugoslavia); and the disappearance of the compromised 
members of the previous regime through death or exile. Unless one of these valves operated 
to relieve the pressure, the country would, they argue, arrive at a point at which some form of 
criminal, civil or political transitional justice measures would be realised. Continuing the 
analogy, Moran and Jaskovska argue that the ‘fuel’ that heats up the political pressure cooker 
had to be derived from an untainted non-communist political elite who were not simply 
converted communists so that ‘(o)nce this “fuel” has been found, and finds itself in power, 
the pressure cooker will heat up, exerting greater and greater pressure to prosecute and punish 
the former communist torturers’. 81  
 
To put it another way, they argue that a ‘double transition’ had to occur in many countries 
and, unless one of the release valves operated to relieve the pressure, the country would then 
arrive at the point at which prosecutions, would be realised. In order for this analogy to 
operate in Poland (and Hungary), they also take into account my ‘politics of the present’ 
explanation arguing that if a post-communist state had, as in the Polish case, a large reformed 
communist successor party that could legitimately contend for power and re-emerged 
successfully as the ruling party, the temptation for non-communist opposition forces to use 
calls for lustration as a political weapon greatly increased the likelihood of transitional justice 
being pursued. This, they argue, was precisely what happened in Poland after the Democratic 
Left Alliance and Peasant Party won the 1993 Polish parliamentary election, so that non-
communist politicians had a political incentive to use the issue of lustration for political 
purposes, unlike in the cases where communist successors did not pose a threat. 
 
Another notable attempt to synthesise and bring together ‘historical’, ‘transition type’ and 
‘politics of the present’ type explanatory approaches to explain the scope and pace of 
transitional justice efforts, and why some countries re-examined and condemned their past 
sooner and more comprehensively than others, is developed by Stan.
82
 Stan’s empirical base 
is a very broad survey of all post-communist states from 1989-2007 examining the adoption 
of transitional justice legislation in the areas of lustration, court proceedings and secret 
service file access. In a similar approach to Nedelsky’s, Stan argues that three factors - the 
relationship between the regime and opposition during the communist and pre-communist 
periods, the legitimacy of the communist (and post-communist) elites, and the relative 
political power of communist successor parties and their former opposition - were, in 
combination, the strongest predictors in explaining the comprehensiveness and stringency of 
transitional justice efforts. This is measured by the groups targeted by lustration and file 
access laws and the implications for those encompassed by them, together with the number of 
trials against former communist officials and security service functionaries. Stan argues that, 
in a clear pattern across the region, former communists voted against lustration and file 
access laws while parties emerging from the anti-communist opposition provided the impetus 
for them. The outcome of this struggle was strongly influenced by three interrelated factors: 
the country’s pre-communist level of experience with pluralism; the composition, orientation, 
and strength of the opposition, both before and after 1989; and the communist regime’s 
dominant methods of ensuring societal compliance with its rule through repression and/or co-
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option. Critiquing other theories, she argues that they draw too sharp temporal distinctions 
between different time periods - namely, the (pre-communist and communist) past, the 
transition to democracy or the post-communist present - suggesting that one particular period 
was of greater importance - and, therefore, neglect the integral relationships between them. 
Rather, she claims the past and the present were closely linked so that ‘(t)he national 
specificity of the communist past led to a particular type of transition which, in turn led to a 
specific post-communist political constellation that facilitated or prevented transitional 
justice’.83 
 
Thus, in countries like Poland (but also the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Baltic states) 
that had a pre-communist history of strong multi-party politics, and where the opposition to 
the communist regime comprised a combination of dissidents, mass movement members and 
internally exiled technocrats, a well-organised, well-educated, potentially powerful 
alternative elite emerged in the post-communist period.
84
 These counter-elites were able to 
gain sufficient electoral strength to adopt transitional justice legislation such as lustration. 
However, their orientation towards communism’s legitimacy was, according to Stan, 
grounded in their experience under that regime, so that transitional justice in countries like 
Poland (and even more so Hungary), where the communist regime relied more on co-optation 
and allowed some level of reform, was less stringent than in those countries (such as the 
Czech Republic, East Germany and the Baltic states) where communist rule was enforced 
primarily through repression and ideological rigidity. 
 
Explanatory models such as these that try to blend and synthesise communist and post-
communist (and, in Stan’s case, pre-communist) factors to explain variations in transitional 
justice - and specifically why, in cases such as Poland, progressively more radical lustration 
and file access legislation was introduced - are ambitious and often produce complex 
explanatory frameworks. However, they are vague in explaining the precise mechanisms 
involved in how exactly and why particular historical legacies in a country like Poland 
produced particular lustration outcomes at particular times; in other words why the issue 
recurred in the way that they did and at the point in time that it did. Here, much more 
contingent ‘agency’ factors still come into play and not all of these can be traced back to 
historical-structural causes. In particular, these models do not take into account that the ebb 
and flow of lustration in cases such as post-communist Poland may have been due to the fact 
that political elites actually changed their stance on the issue. Interestingly, although Stan 
argues that ‘it (history) matters a lot’, at the end of her account she also acknowledges that it 
‘is not destiny’ and that the ‘individual personalities of politicians assuming leading roles in 
speeding up or slowing down the transitional justice process, and awareness of developments 
and problems in neighbours make an imprint on how national elites approach the politics of 
memory’;85 in other words, an acknowledgement that ‘agency matters’ too. 
 
Explaining recurrence through party elite strategies 
 
One of the key issues that arises when trying to explain with more precision and identify why 
the transitional justice recurs at particular times and in particular forms is the extent to which 
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political strategy and calculation or ideological and programmatic motives are the key drivers 
of (late) lustration and truth revelation. One particular variant of the ‘politics of the present’ 
approach, that might be termed the political elite strategy explanation, is based on the notion 
that political actors responded rationally to impulses such as (actual or anticipated) popular 
and societal demand to further their own partisan interests. Although this angle was not 
developed explicitly in my own collaborative work with Williams and Fowler, and our 
analysis left open the possibility that lustration may have been motivated by ideological 
conviction, the clear implication as it built on Welsh’s framework was that the issue was, to 
some extent at least, instrumentalised as an element of inter-party competition. 
 
A more recent attempt to develop such a political elite strategy explanation for late lustration 
by Nalepa is rooted in a much more explicitly rational-choice framework and based on the 
idea that, when determining their strategic choices, supporters of lustration used the issue in a 
calculating way for party advantage.
86
 Based on a combination of elite interviews, archival 
evidence and statistical analysis of survey experiments conducted in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary as well as Poland, Nalepa tries to tackle two key puzzles regarding the specific 
timing of transitional justice in post-communist states, particularly in cases such as the Polish 
one where pacted, peaceful transitions to democracy were followed by delayed lustrations. 
Firstly, why did the anti-communist opposition not pursue retributive justice immediately 
after the transition in spite of the prevailing incentives to do so but later when popular support 
for its adoption had (apparently) dampened? Secondly, why did transitional justice get 
adopted in some countries when communist successor parties, who had initially insisted that 
they should be immune from such measures as part of the (implicit) price for their negotiating 
liberalisation and democratisation, were in office; again such as (Nalepa argues was the case 
in) Poland? 
 
Nalepa’s answers to the both of these questions are based on what she terms a ‘skeletons in 
the closet’ argument which models the incentives of former dissidents from the anti-
communist opposition and regime functionaries. Given that former dissidents, who comprised 
a considerable part of the new democratic elite, were uncertain about the extent to which the 
opposition groups of which they were previously members were infiltrated by communist 
security service informants, they exercised restraint in introducing lustration and transitional 
justice procedures fearful that this would have exposed the ‘skeletons’ in their own ‘closet’. 
This uncertainty she argues, acted as the former regime elites’ insurance against possible 
transitional justice policies because it meant that, at the beginning of the roundtable 
negotiations, they had a distinctive ‘informational advantage’ over the opposition87 and thus 
made the anti-communist opposition’s commitments to amnesty credible. The former regime 
elites knew, she argues, the extent to which members of the various dissident groups had 
been engaged in collaboration and could successfully use this information to their advantage. 
On the other hand, the risk-averse opposition preferred to keep these ‘skeletons in the closet’ 
even if there were fewer of them than the communists led them to believe.
 
 
 
In terms of tackling the second puzzle - why did former communists apparently behave in a 
seemingly irrational way and ‘self-lustrate’? - Nalepa develops an agenda setting model 
where the critical parameters are electoral turnover and restrictions of procedures for 
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parliamentary decision-making. She argues that communist successor parties such as the 
Democratic Left Alliance passed mild lustration bills because they anticipated that they 
would lose power to anti-communist forces; as, indeed, they did in Poland 1997. Arguing that 
‘accepted lustration proposals in one legislative term form the status quo of the succeeding 
term’ the ex-communists thus tried to appease a pivotal median political party in order to ‘set 
the future status quo strategically’ in a way that prevented harsher legislation in the future by 
reducing ‘the future win-set of the future median party’ and thus ‘the room for the new 
proposing party - the anti-communists - to shift policy in the extreme (harsher) direction’.88 
In other words, the reformed communists’ seemingly irrational behaviour was rational 
because initiating (less punitive versions of) transitional justice was ‘part of a pre-emptive 
strategy to avoid brutally harsh transitional justice policies’. 89 So while the timing of the 
lustration law may have been influenced heavily by the timing of a future election, which 
they anticipated losing, it was not introduced to respond to electoral demands but rather to 
eliminate electoral competition.
 
For Nalepa, thus, the former communists’ support for 
lustration was not the result of a desire for an honest re-examination of the communist past, 
but a pre-emptive strategy designed to protect their political careers from more radical 
policies. 
 
In terms of the Polish case, Nalepa also attempts to explain why the issue of truth revelation 
re-surfaced again in the mid-2000s so many years after the transition to democracy and 
specifically why the lustration law was amended and strengthened after Law and Justice 
came to office in 2005. She argues that this was due to the rise of political elites that emerged 
from anti-communist opposition groupings that had not been infiltrated by communist 
security services and, therefore, had fewer collaborators in their ranks and were untainted by 
collaboration with the previous regime. Lustration, Nalepa says, had distributive effects and 
Law and Justice had all the pre-requisites of a party that would have benefited from it. She 
maintains that earlier in their political careers Law and Justice leader Jarosław Kaczyński and 
his twin brother Lech (who was elected as the Law and Justice candidate for President of 
Poland at the same time as the party came to office in 2005) knew that the party leadership 
was free from security service informers.
90
 Nalepa claims that they had this knowledge as a 
result of Lech Kaczynski holding the posts of head of the Supreme Audit Office (Najwyższa 
Izba Kontroli: NIK) between 1992-95 and justice minister in the Solidarity Electoral Action-
led government between 2000-1, which allowed him to survey the files of party members and 
locate hidden ‘skeletons’.91 Armed with this knowledge of who would probably be the most 
affected by lustration, and having a parliamentary caucus comprising very young members 
and those with a background in opposition groups that maintained low profiles before the 
transition, Law and Justice was, therefore, not afraid that lustration would uncover skeletons 
in its own closet. Moreover, she goes on to claim that the Kaczyński brothers changed their 
party organisation four times providing them with ‘an opportunity to purge party ranks of 
known collaborators’ which, she argues, they ‘took liberal advantage of’. 92 In other words: 
‘by belonging to low-profile underground groups prior to the transition, enjoying access to 
secret information about which parties were infiltrated with former secret police agents, and 
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purging known collaborators from party ranks when reinventing party labels, the Kaczyński 
brothers reached a point at which they were certain they would benefit from lustration’.93 
 
There are, however, problems both with Nalepa’s explanation of the Polish case specifically 
and her explanatory framework more generally. Firstly, her assertion that ‘the opposition’s 
preferences over transitional justice were shaped by its beliefs about its degree of 
infiltration’94 is based mainly on conjecture and assumption and is suggestive rather than 
conclusive. Her only firm supporting evidence for her claim that opposition politicians 
undertook this ‘skeletons in the closet’-type calculus are 13 anonymised interviews with no 
direct quotes from any of the individuals concerned.
95
 Nalepa herself admits that she cannot 
‘test directly the hypothesis about how the type of dissident groups in which ECE (East-
Central European) parties originated explains attitudes towards lustration’ as this ‘require(d) 
data on (the) pre-transition activities of politicians’, 96 but this does not prevent her making 
bold claims that ‘skeletons’ were distributed among the post-opposition parties in the way 
that she suggests. Her argument also ignores that fact that many, if not most, members of 
anti-communist democratic opposition groups were not, in fact, secret service infiltrators; 
indeed, it is contradicted somewhat by her quotation from one of her interviewees from the 
communist successor elites that the opposition representatives in the round table agreements 
where those who could not be broken by the secret police.
97
 
 
In terms of her explanation of why former communists chose to ‘self-lustrate’, there are a 
number of empirical problems with this in the Polish case, the most serious of which is the 
fact that, although the Democratic Left Alliance and President Kwaśniewski proposed 
lustration measures in parliament, they did so in 1996: well before the next parliamentary 
election was due and at a time when the Polish pro-lustration right was actually weak, divided 
and at a low ebb politically. At the time when they might have acted in anticipation of a 
possible election defeat, in April 1997, the communist successor party actually voted against 
the lustration law in parliament; although, for various reasons (discussed above), Mr 
Kwaśniewski chose not to veto the legislation and signed the law in July. Moreover, while 
there may have been an element of pre-emption in both the Democratic Left Alliance and Mr 
Kwaśniewski’s behaviour - proposing lustration bills in 1996 and, in the President’s case, 
signing the new legislation in July 1997 to head off more radical proposals - that was not the 
reason why they were passed in parliament in April 1997. This was, as noted above, due to 
the emergence of a ‘lustration coalition’ comprising two opposition parties and the 
communist successor’s junior coalition partner, the Peasant Party (admittedly a regime 
successor grouping, but not the communist successor party). Mr Kwaśniewski may well have 
acted strategically in approving the 1997 lustration bill to pass into law but this could have 
been as much about political positioning as pre-emption to prevent the subsequent emergence 
of more radical proposals. Specifically, the President’s actions may have been part of a 
broader political calculation that involved trading off passing a law that he was 
uncomfortable with and trying to distance himself from his political base as part of a longer-
term political strategy of attempting to portray himself as a non-partisan ‘President of all 
Poles’. Moreover, as Calhoun speculates, it may well have been that ‘with parliamentary 
elections quickly approaching, he (Mr Kwaśniewski) did not want his party to appear to be 
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concealing or justifying the errors of the past’.98 In fact, the degree of uncertainty about the 
outcome of 1997 election was actually much higher than Nalepa indicates and it was far from 
clear to the Democratic Left Alliance that they would lose their dominant position in the new 
parliament. Finally, it is questionable whether, when considering what kind of lustration law 
to introduce and support, Democratic Left Alliance legislators really acted like amateur 
political scientists factoring in the latest (as noted above, far from conclusively negative in 
any case) opinion polls, trying on the basis of this to anticipate the position of the median 
member of the new parliament, and then drafting appropriate legislation in accordance with 
this. Again, Nalepa does not really provide any hard evidence of this and even admits herself 
(albeit rather cryptically) that ‘conclusive inferences cannot be drawn by projecting the 
results of elections onto expectations about losing power’.99 
 
The empirical basis for Nalepa’s explanation for why the lustration law was amended and 
strengthened in 2006-7 is also rather flimsy and contains some factual errors. Contrary to 
what Nalepa argues, it was not Law and Justice that ‘promised to make public all of the 
documentation collected by the dreaded secret police’. 100 Rather it was Civic Platform (and 
especially, Jan Rokita, the then head of the party’s parliamentary caucus and prime 
ministerial candidate in the 2005 elections) that pushed hardest for a policy of completely 
opening up the security service files but this call was restricted to politicians; and Lech 
Kaczyński actually opposed the idea during the 2005 election campaign.101 Indeed, the 2006-
7 lustration law was passed with broad cross-party support, except for the Democratic Left 
Alliance. This included Civic Platform, many of whose leaders were, of course, once 
prominent figures within the Freedom Union and its predecessor the Democratic Union (Unia 
Demokratyczna: UD) who, as heirs to the opposition politicians involved in the round table 
negotiations, would, according to Nalepa’s logic, have been among the political groupings 
most infiltrated by the communist-era security services. It is far from clear that the post of 
head of the Supreme Audit Office and justice minister really gave Lech Kaczyński the access 
to security service files that Nalepa implies. She does not provide any evidence for her claim 
that those parties pushing for the strengthening of the lustration law, like Law and Justice, 
comprised new political elites and very young parliamentarians together with those who had 
a background in low profile opposition groups which had not been infiltrated by the 
communist security services - and, therefore, contained fewer collaborators. Her claim that 
the Kaczyński brothers changed party organisations four times and that, among former anti-
communist dissidents, they ‘were probably those who most frequently terminated one party 
and created another’ is incorrect.102 She also provides no real evidence that they ‘took liberal 
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advantage of this’ to ‘purge party ranks of known collaborators’.103 Indeed, there was much 
contrary evidence, that Law and Justice was actually dominated by an ‘old guard’ from the 
Centre Agreement party whom Jarosław Kaczyński trusted on the grounds that he enjoyed 
long-standing collaborations with them and that they remained loyal to him even at the end of 
the 1990s when the twins found themselves in the political doldrums. The Kaczyński brothers 
did not (as Nalepa claims) join Lech Wałęsa’s Non-party Bloc to Support Reforms 
(Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform: BBWR), which did not (as she also claims) win 
parliamentary elections and help Mr Wałęsa broaden the powers of the presidency. By 1993 
when the Bloc was formed, the Kaczyński brothers had broken away from the then 
President’s political camp and were deeply hostile to him. Nor did they then break with the 
Bloc to form the Centre Agreement, this political grouping was formed three years earlier in 
May 1990. The Kaczyński brothers and the Centre Agreement party did, as Nalepa claims, 
support the Solidarity Electoral Action electoral conglomerate which won the 1997 
parliamentary election and then abandoned it to form Law and Justice; although Jarosław 
Kaczyński actually stood as an independent on Jan Olszewski’s Movement for Poland’s 
Reconstruction (Ruch Odbudowy Polski: ROP) party list not for Solidarity Electoral Action 
in 1997 and the Centre Agreement split over whether or not to remain part of the latter, with 
the pro-Kaczyński faction choosing to operate independently as early as 1999. 
 
However, notwithstanding problems with Nalepa’s account at an empirical and factual level, 
one of the biggest difficulties with her so-called ‘skeletons in the closet’ model - and, indeed 
(albeit more implicitly) some other variations of the ‘politics of the present’ explanatory 
framework that focus on strategic political and electoral factors (including, I must admit, my 
own previous work on this topic) - is that it posits the notion that the transitional justice issue 
was almost completely instrumentalised by strategic, office-seeking political elites. The 
difficulty with this approach is that it potentially under-estimates the importance of normative 
factors and extent to which the motives of those pushing for transitional justice may have 
been genuinely programmatically and ideologically driven rather than being rooted simply 
rooted in strategic considerations. Even those pro-lustration political actors and parties that 
saw the sponsorship of truth revelation procedures as a useful power tool to gain an 
advantage over their competitors were not necessarily solely (or even mainly) strategically 
motivated and may also have been committed to these policies for ideological and 
programmatic reasons. Stan is surely correct when she says, that ‘it (is) difficult to argue that 
normative considerations of justice are entirely absent’104 and that ‘to reduce the complexity 
of the politics of memory to the level of recognizing it only as a manipulating tool used in the 
cut-throat battles waged by power-thirsty political parties or to relegate it to the grey zone of 
illusory and unattainable myths ignores the Eastern Europeans’ need to know the truth about 
the communist regime, to confront their own personal history, and to obtain justice and 
absolution.’105 
 
Explaining recurrence through ideological-programmatic factors 
 
Indeed, another approach to accounting for different patterns of post-communist lustration 
and transitional justice - including the recurrence of debates and changes of trajectory, as in 
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the Polish case - places greater emphasis on precisely such ideological-programmatic factors. 
These accounts are based on the idea that political elites believed, or came to believe, that a 
more radical approach to such issues was both necessary and desirable from a normative 
perspective. They also envisage scenarios where some elites who always believed that 
lustration was necessary came to subsequently find themselves in a position where they were 
able to implement it. There are a number of examples in the literature on post-communist 
transitional justice that suggest that a greater emphasis should be placed on such normative 
considerations in explaining the recurrence of debates on lustration and truth-revelation 
procedures in countries such as Poland.  
 
For example, in an analysis of the lustration debate in Poland published at the beginning of 
the 2000s (and, therefore, not really taking into account post-1997 developments and failing 
to foresee the problems with the 1997 law and subsequent attempts to amend it), Calhoun 
tries to explain the remarkable ability of the issue to endure, which the Polish case 
exemplified.
106
 She argues that what she termed the ‘power politics’ explanation - which, she 
claimed, ‘Polish scholars and politicians tend to accept as the most fitting one’107 - does not 
account sufficiently for changes of trajectory on the lustration issue because it ignores why 
post-Solidarity liberals in parties such as the Freedom Union (a key member of the ‘lustration 
coalition’ that secured the passage of the 1997 law) and its fore-runners the Democratic 
Union  and Liberal Democratic Congress (Kongres Liberalno Demokratyczny: KLD) 
opposed rather than supported this form of transitional justice for several years after the 
transition began. Rather, Calhoun tries to explain this pattern of lustration by arguing that it 
was not simply ‘power politics’ that shaped Poland’s approach to transitional justice but 
rather that liberal democratic ideology provided a guiding, constraining and justificatory 
framework for debates and political action surrounding the issue. Post-Solidarity liberals 
strongly opposed rather than promoted lustration for several years after the transition began 
because it ‘violated liberal democratic principles’ even though (in contrast to Nalepa’s later 
argument) they ‘seemed to have few ulterior motives in adopting this position, and it 
certainly did not enhance their electoral prospects (to avoid advancing it)’.108 Calhoun argues 
that liberal democratic ideology provided the conceptual framework for debates on the issue 
of lustration in Poland so that they focused on legal procedures not historical justice and 
truth.
109
  
 
Liberal democratic ideology also constrained the range of acceptable policy options by: 
stressing the importance of political inclusion, condemning collective punishment, preventing 
the law from working retroactively by only allowing punishment of acts that were legally 
proscribed at the time, and providing defendants with full prosecution protection. It thus, as 
Calhoun puts it, gave ‘birth to the very idea of an orderly process of lustration rather than a 
spree of revolutionary violence’.110 Post-Solidarity liberals created a political identity for 
                                                          
106
 See: ‘The Ideological Dilemma of Lustration in Poland’. 
107
 See: Ibid, p496. 
108
 See: Ibid, p502. 
109
 Although my own analysis of the 1997/98 lustration law debates found that they also encompassed: a 
citizen’s ‘right to know’, protecting democracy from blackmail of former functionaries, and some elements of 
historical justice. See: Aleks Szczerbiak, ‘Dealing with the Communist Past or the Politics of the Present?’, 
pp563-565. 
110
 See: ‘The Ideological Dilemma of Lustration in Poland’, p497. Although some writers, such as Ackerman, 
argue that the legal hurdles in the civil law context of lustration were very low with the rule of law imposing few 
constraints (as the functionary in question did not enjoy the full protection of due process, the ban on 
retroactivity and equality before the law) and thus recommend it as the preferred form of coming to terms with 
33 
 
themselves linked to this liberal democratic ideology, and ‘they were willing to stick with it 
even if it did not always yield the most popular results’.111 However, at the same time liberal 
democratic ideology gave the former communists opportunities to enter procedural debates 
about lustration with confidence and an opportunity to offer good public reasons to argue 
against a process that they were naturally inclined to oppose anyway, as well as allowing 
them to forge an un-expected alliance with post-Solidarity liberals that prevented lustration in 
Poland during the early years of the transition. 
 
Drawing our attention to the fact that the 1997 lustration law (and, indeed, the 2006-7 
amendments to it) was supported by political elites who, for various reasons, had (apparently) 
changed their minds on this issue, Calhoun goes on to argue that its later adoption came about 
through the fact that, over time, many post-Solidarity liberals started to appreciate the 
subtleties of the relationship between lustration and liberal democracy. At the same time, the 
ability of individuals linked to the former regime to take advantage of communist-era 
networks to turn their old political power into economic power prompted many Poles, 
including some post-Solidarity liberals, to question the virtues of the ‘amnesty but not 
amnesia’ option. Consequently, Calhoun argues that Polish lustration debates grew more 
nuanced as party politicians from the post-Solidarity liberal milieu learned from their own 
experiences, especially the botched attempt at lustration in 1992, and increasingly weighed 
other considerations against the civil rights of the accused. These included the importance of 
the truth and the fact that their constituents had the ‘right’ to know a political candidate’s 
character. They also concluded that the absence of lustration led to ‘un-official’ screening of 
individuals, thereby creating instability, and that clear procedures were needed to assess the 
validity of these accusations. By setting up a hierarchy of values, liberal democratic ideology 
thereby facilitated political learning as throughout the post-communist period Polish political 
leaders from across the spectrum professed that democracy and individual rights were 
primary values; but over time post-Solidarity liberals and ex-communist leftists drew 
different conclusions about whether or not lustration would best promote these values. These 
post-Solidarity liberals also learned new ideological lessons from international experience as 
to how to design lustration in order to respect the principles of the rule of law and liberal 
democracy, both by drawing upon examples from neighbouring countries such as Germany 
and through explicit guidelines from international organisations like the Council of Europe. 
 
Building on Calhoun’s arguments that lustration arose out of an ideological commitment to a 
new liberal order and ‘a way to prevent past political iniquities form polluting or 
contaminating the new society and polity’,112 Appel also discusses the ideational motivations 
behind what she terms ‘anti-communist programmes’, exploring ‘how ideas and beliefs 
shaped the development of programmes of retrospective justice’. 113  Arguing that ‘ideas 
matter’ or ‘may matter’, she highlights the fact that, due to the methodological challenges of 
measuring and comparing non-material variables, previous research tended to focus on 
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interests or narrow partisan power calculations and concerns rather than the under-studied 
areas of broad normative values and conceptions of justice, and thereby ‘misses the greatest 
motivation behind the adoption of these programmes’. 114 
 
Appel acknowledges that a ‘skeptic might find politicians’ ideational or ethical motivations 
suspect’115 especially given the problems with the implementation of lustration which was, at 
times, used as a political weapon and ‘given its frequent abuse and exploitation…it is easy 
to…assert that lustration was supported not for reasons of historical justice or anti-
communism but for its political utility’ 116  Nonetheless, she argues that anti-communist 
programmes were much more than this, citing the work of Weber, Goldstein, Keohane, Blyth 
and Ackerman to draw attention to the fact that ideas and interests are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive as causal factors. Appel claims that, although they may have served the 
political interests of some leaders, this did not refute the fact that such programmes had 
ideational or ethical dimensions. She points out correctly that ‘(i)n social science analysis…it 
is always easier to reduce human motivation to self-serving materialist behaviour’ and 
‘(p)erhaps it even seems naïve to attribute lofty goals to politicians or policies’117 but argues 
that in national debates on anti-communist programmes proponents and opponents discussed 
them explicitly in ideational and even moral terms claiming that ‘(d)espite its misuse, 
lustration nevertheless did arise out of ethical and normative concerns’ 118  as a ‘way of 
protecting the inchoate liberal democratic order’. 119  
 
Truth revelation and post-communist democratisation 
 
A good example of how an academic explanatory debate about the timing of lustration 
becomes linked with more normative approaches is Horne’s argument that the emergence of 
late lustration was linked to efforts to improve the quality of post-communist democracy.
120
 
This directs our attention to the important point that in many countries, such as Poland, 
examining political discussions about lustration separately from other political developments 
under-estimates the extent to which these issues have often become entwined with other, 
broader post-communist democratisation discourses on questions such as: the public’s right 
to information about the backgrounds of its public representatives, officials and authority 
figures, and the need to tackle corruption. These relate as much to the relationship between 
transitional justice and the perceived failures of post-communist democratisation as they do 
to questions of historical justice and dealing with the communist past, with lustration posited 
as a project designed to implement democratic renewal and enhance the quality of democracy 
in these states. This is interesting because the normative literature on post-communist 
transitional justice has often posited liberal democratic legal-ethical arguments both for and 
against adopting a radical approach to lustration: counter-posing questions of securing 
historical justice and allowing freedom of information on the one hand, with concerns about 
ascribing collective guilt and retroactive justice on the other.  
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In the Polish case, the specific focus for this approach was the so-called ‘Fourth Republic’ 
project, based on a radical critique of post-communist Poland as corrupt and requiring far-
reaching moral and political reform. Originally an idea and critique that enjoyed quite broad 
political support (including from politicians and intellectual milieu associated with Civic 
Platform), the 'Fourth Republic' came to be associated primarily with the 2005-2007 Law and 
Justice-led governments.
121
 Broadening the scope of lustration came to be seen as a key 
element of such a renewal. Specifically, as noted above, the notion that political life in the 
post-communist period was manipulated by the former (but still influential) communist-era 
security services - and, more broadly, the perceived ability of elites linked to the former 
regime to take advantage of their communist-era networks to turn their old political power 
into economic power
122
 - prompted many Poles to question the virtues of the so-called ‘thick 
line’ approach towards transitional justice. 
 
Building on this notion that ‘there is a collective sense that the past actively affects the 
political and economic reality of the present’123 Horne thus, sees the fact that countries like 
Poland embarked upon late lustration programmes as an expression of the perceived need to 
deepen the democratisation process. The objective of these programmes was to expand the 
scope of transparency measures associated with transitional justice such as lustration to 
include those in ‘positions of public trust’ in both the public and private sectors including 
journalists, academics and business leaders. As Horne puts it, ‘lustration is resonating with a 
symbolic and institutional sense that something about the democratic transitions in 
incomplete’.124 Horne rejects what she calls the ‘dominant explanation’ that ‘lustration is…a 
(tool of party politics and) threat to democratic consolidation’ and draws a distinction 
between lustration laws that were ‘politically motivated’ (which, she argues, they all were) 
and those that were ‘politically manipulated’ (emphasis added) or ‘elite driven’ and ‘wielded 
against political parties for personal gain’ leading to ‘personal advantaging of the party in 
power’ rather than advancing a reform-agenda.125 She goes on to argue that the evidence of 
late lustration in Poland supported neither a strong ‘revenge hypothesis’ nor a ‘limited 
hypothesis that the laws were timed and designed for direct political party advantage’.126 
Rather, she claims that late lustration was both linked to and driven by legitimate social, 
economic and political concerns.
127
  Thus post-communist governments – not just in Poland 
but in other post-communist states such as Latvia, Macedonia, Slovakia and even those that 
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instituted transitional justice measures early in the transition such as the Czech Republic – 
continued to grapple with the issue and, in some cases, used late lustration as a means to 
further and correct some of the problems associated with post-communist transitions by 
addressing public concerns about issues such as corruption, distrust and inequality.
 
The new 
lustration laws were thereby re-structured and packaged with other reform measures, 
specifically anti-corruption programmes. 
 
Horne, as well as Calhoun and Appel, are right to draw our attention to the fact that one 
cannot assume a priori that lustration is used simply for political manipulation, which some 
of the ‘politics of the present’ approaches have a tendency to imply. However, in rejecting 
‘power politics’-type explanations Horne may have gone too far to the other extreme by 
accepting the arguments of lustration proponents at face value.
128
 Her argument often seems 
to rest on setting out what a lustration programme driven by legitimate concerns would look 
like and then assuming that if these are the kinds of arguments and justifications that are in 
place then her case is proven. An example of this is when she says that ‘(l)ate lustration laws 
(in these countries) look like reformist tools, designed and framed by the government as a 
way to create an institutional and symbolic break with the past in order to further the 
democratic transition.’ (emphasis added).129 Although she acknowledges initially that these 
two explanatory frameworks, power politics and ideological-programmatic, are ‘not mutually 
exclusive’, 130  she then goes on to discuss them as if they were. Moreover, while the 
proponents of late lustration may have presented and justified their proposals as being driven 
by legitimate concerns about the progress of democratisation and correcting problems 
associated with post-communist transition, this did not, of course, necessarily mean that these 
were the actual reasons why they were proposing them, and certainly not the only ones. For 
example, Horne presents the fact that there were ‘opponents of lustration (who) have changed 
their mind’131 as evidence that late lustration was genuinely motivated by programmatic-
ideological concerns and it does suggest prime facie that that may well be the case. However, 
if, in the Polish case, she is referring to politicians linked to Civic Platform (she does not 
specify this) then an equally plausible explanation would be that this apparent change of heart 
by the party’s leaders was motivated as much by political manoeuvring as it was by 
ideological-programmatic concerns.  
 
In other words, calls for lustration and greater file transparency may have been part of a 
political positioning exercise and it is difficult in practice to separate these ‘strategic’ motives 
out from more ‘ideological-programmatic’ and ‘democratic’ ones. Apart from the fact that 
the idea that lustration was driven by ‘legitimate’ concerns about the progress of 
democratisation rather than being politically manipulated is highly contestable, the division 
between these sets of motives that Horne posits is arguably simply too Manichean in the real 
world. Politicians were likely to have had a variety of motivations and justifications and 
addressed a range of concerns which were very difficult to separate out for analytical 
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 It is also a shame that her empirical discussion, especially the account of the passage of the 2006-7 Polish 
law, lacks Polish (and, indeed, Romanian) language primary sources such as parliamentary debates, which 
would have helped her to get at the ‘declared’ motives of legislators, at least. 
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purposes. Horne’s argument that ‘the party initiating the reforms was adversely impacted by 
the lustration programmes which works against a traditional argument that lustration laws are 
tools of party politics designed to confer direct political advantage on the initiating party’132 
ignores the fact that, while some party members may have suffered from such programmes, 
the overall effect for the party may have been beneficial - or that other parties might have 
suffered more. Moreover, even a genuinely motivated political move could also have been 
used for the purposes of political manipulation. Indeed, such moves were likely to have been 
motivated by a mix of concerns with political positioning possibly being the dominant one 
while ideological-programmatic considerations were used simply as a justificatory narrative. 
Lustration laws were thus bundled together with other concerns and as part of a broader 
political framework for purely instrumental reasons. Or both sets of concerns might have 
been equally important in law-makers considerations. 
 
Nonetheless, the way that calls for greater lustration and file access, and transitional justice 
more generally, may have become bound up with other issues, particularly critiques of post-
communist democratisation, as part of a broader policy package may also help to explain why 
the introduction of more radical lustration procedures may have been demand- as well as 
supply-driven, even though some commentators have argued that the issue was of low 
salience to most voters in countries like Poland. For example, in her explanation of why the 
truth revelation issue recurred Nalepa claims that ‘lustration laws are not…a response to 
popular demand for holding various members of the ancient regime accountable for human 
rights violations’. Rather, she argues, lustration laws were ‘supplied by political elites who 
stood to gain from having lustration laws in place’. 133 To support her claim, Nalepa presents 
statistical analysis that, she argues, shows ‘little support for the hypothesized correlation 
between voters’ support for lustration and their willingness to elect politicians who adhere to 
a lustration platform’. Indeed, ‘even voters who would like to see former collaborators 
exposed’ she claims ‘appear unwilling to make their vote depend on this preference.’ 134 
Moreover, Nalepa also claims out that the harshest lustration laws were introduced when 
public support for radical transitional justice had actually declined.
135
 
 
For sure, polling on Polish public attitudes towards transitional justice issues suggests that 
lustration and file access did not seem to be issues that, on their own, determined election 
outcomes and there was no conclusive evidence of a linear relationship between voter 
demand and transitional justice supply. While most Poles favoured a radical approach to the 
issue - and there was certainly popular support for, for example, making access to communist 
secret service files widely available together with radical lustration based on vetting those 
holding in a wide range of public offices - they also did not consider it to be an important or 
salient issue.
136
 However, notwithstanding the fact that Nalepa’s data focuses on a series of 
snapshots from which it is difficult to discern clear trends, looking at the issue this way may 
be misleading because it under-estimates the extent that citizens might have considered 
questions of lustration and file access to be of much greater (and even crucial) importance, 
when considered in conjunction with other issues and policy packages. Moreover, even if 
voters did not see these issues as a priority, politicians may have perceived that there was 
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greater support for and interest in lustration and file access than there actually was. In other 
words, the relationship between political supply and voter demand for truth revelation 
procedures may have been more complex and inter-active than commentators like Nalepa 
give credit for and voter demand for transitional justice may have been one (even if not 
necessarily the most important) contributory factor in determining whether or not politicians 
decided to pursue this policy. 
 
Historical justice or the ‘politics of history’? 
 
Finally, issues of lustration and file access have also become embroiled in what might be 
termed the ‘politics of history’ as much as they have the ‘politics of historical justice’. In 
Poland, the former concept was associated with a group of young conservative academics 
closely linked with the ‘Fourth Republic’ project who were influential upon the Law and 
Justice governments and especially the late President Lech Kaczyński (although most of them 
drifted away out of the party’s orbit after his death in 2010). Its main objective was to present 
historical events and narrative in a way that strengthened Poland’s national unity and 
cohesion internally and thereby helped to ensure that its interpretation of history (on issues 
such as the expulsion of Germans from Polish territory after the Second World War) was 
widely accepted in international circles. However, one can also apply this concept to the way 
that contemporary history, particularly the communist past, was used to legitimate certain 
political actors and de-legitimate their opponents. Interestingly, this process was evident not 
just in debates between political figures linked to the former communist regime and the 
democratic opposition but also between different groups of former oppositionists. A prime 
example of this kind of dispute, which ran throughout the entire post-1989 period, was the 
different attitudes towards and interpretations of the spring 1989 round table negotiations 
which led to the semi-free elections that precipitated the end of the Polish communist regime. 
Critics of the round table agreements saw them as fatally flawed, allowing the former ruling 
elites to make a smooth transition into the new political and economic system, and entrench 
their power and influential positions within it. 
 
This differs from the way that the existing literature posits the lustration issue as being used 
to gain strategic advantage through, for example, presenting political opponents as being 
insufficiently (or too) radical in terms of their approach to vetting, or calculating that 
revealing or not revealing files about individual politicians is likely to support a particular 
party and/or damage its political opponents. It is more about using the contents of communist 
secret files, and the debates surrounding them, to locate that party within a particular 
historical narrative that it considers advantageous. An example of the way in which the 
process of political self-legitimation and de-legitimation of political opponents became 
entwined in debates about lustration and how to deal with the communist past, were divisions 
within the post-Solidarity elite over whether or not Lech Wałęsa had collaborated with the 
communist secret services as an informer in the early 1970s. These came to a head in June 
2008 when, as noted above, amid huge public interest the Institute of National Remembrance 
published a book written by two of its historians. Although the accusations themselves were 
not new, they claimed to have found previously unknown communist security service files 
which contained strong circumstantial evidence that linked Mr Wałęsa to a very active 
collaborator codenamed ‘Bolek’ who informed to the secret police on his fellow Gdańsk 
shipyard workers in the early 1970s. The authors also claimed that Mr Wałęsa had accessed, 
tried to doctor, removed, and even destroyed some of the incriminating documents among his 
archived files while President from 1990-95. 
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Mr Wałęsa, who was involved in several court cases against former Solidarity colleagues 
who accused him of being ‘Bolek’, denied accusations that he had ever been an agent and 
claimed that the documents incriminating him were forgeries. He cited as evidence the fact 
that he was cleared by a court of having submitted a false lustration declaration during the 
2000 presidential election campaign and in 2005 was given access to his security service files 
by the Institute of National Remembrance as someone who fell into the category of being 
persecuted under communism. Moreover, the former President’s reputation was defended by 
Civic Platform who argued that the publication of the Institute of Public Remembrance book 
was the latest move in a political war waged being against Mr Wałęsa by the Law and Justice 
party. Having helped to run his 1990 presidential election campaign and then worked in his 
presidential chancellery, Lech Kaczyński and his twin brother Jarosław, who went on to form 
and lead the Law and Justice party, had been in a bitter dispute with Mr Wałęsa since the 
early 1990s and accused him of being a communist security service agent from the time that 
these allegations first emerged following the publication of the ‘Macierewicz list’ in 1992. 
Civic Platform argued that, by attacking Mr Wałęsa (whom they claimed symbolised 
Poland’s international reputation as being in the forefront of a historical struggle for political 
freedom in the former Soviet bloc) Law and Justice was damaging an important Polish trade 
mark, or ‘positive myth’, and thus the country’s image abroad.  
 
In fact, for his part Mr Wałęsa supported Civic Platform against Law and Justice in the bitter 
struggle that these two parties had been engaged in since they came to dominate the Polish 
political scene in 2005. The former President played an important role in helping to 
legitimate Civic Platform in the eyes of many Poles who identified with the Solidarity 
tradition and, to the extent that he was discredited as a symbol of the anti-communist 
democratic opposition, he was, of course, less well able to perform this function for the party. 
Given the way that Mr Wałęsa thereby became an important element of Civic Platform’s 
‘politics of history’, his apparent ‘un-masking’ by historians linked to the Institute of 
National Remembrance thus ensured that the issue of lustration and file access once again 
became entwined in party political conflicts. In fact, as noted above, claiming that the 
Cenckiewicz-Gontarczyk book demonstrated that the Institute was being used by Law and 
Justice as a tool in its political battles, its publication prompted the Civic Platform-led 
government to introduce legislation (eventually passed in 2010) that reformed the way that its 
leadership was selected in the hope of preventing further publications of this kind. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Lustration is one of (if not the) most important and controversial means of dealing with the 
communist past. Post-communist Eastern Europe was the first region that embraced it and it 
has remained an important method of transitional justice, so much so that many commenters 
have used it to measure progress in this area in post-communist states more generally. There 
is some debate and disagreement in the academic literature as to whether the term lustration 
should include just those who worked for or collaborated with the secret police or those who 
held senior positions within the party-state bureaucracy more generally, as well as whether it 
encompasses exclusion from, or limiting of access to, certain offices, or simply vetting 
individuals for these links without any such consequences flowing automatically. Here, as in 
previous papers that I have written or co-written on this topic, I have defined lustration as 
‘actions directed against former functionaries of and collaborators with the state security 
apparatus’ that can include ‘simply vetting or screening individuals for past associations with 
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the communist security services without any sanction necessarily following.’ However, 
lustration depends a great deal on access to the secret archives compiled by the communist-
era political police so one can only get to grips with it properly by studying it both as a 
‘personnel system’ but also more broadly as a ‘truth-revelation procedure’ in conjunction 
with the issue of security service file access. 
 
Poland is an archetypal case of the phenomena of late and recurring lustration. Although it 
began with a communist-forgiving approach and an initial avoidance of the issue, lustration 
and file access retained a remarkable ability to endure and remain on the political agenda 
when one might have expected them to fade from public memory. Subsequent years were 
punctured by various attempts to renew efforts at lustration with belated mild lustration and 
file access laws being adopted and, after some delay, becoming operational at the end of the 
1990s and then more radical laws being approved (although not fully enacted) in 2007. This 
significant delay - and, more broadly, the recurrence of the issue in political debates - is one 
of the most striking features of Polish lustration and one that needs explanation and analysis. 
It thus provides us with an excellent basis for developing frameworks to explain the 
phenomenon of ‘late’ lustration.  
 
The key problem with frameworks that try and explain such phenomena through historical 
and structural factors is that, although they may have successfully predicted the lack of an 
‘early’ interest in lustration and transitional justice in countries such as Poland, they are too 
static and have problems in accounting for and explaining the re-emergence of the issue and 
the often quite radical changes of trajectory. Explanatory models that try to blend and 
synthesise communist and post-communist (and sometimes pre-communist) factors to explain 
variations in transitional justice - and specifically why, in cases such as Poland, the issue 
recurred strongly and progressively more radical lustration and file access legislation was 
introduced - are ambitious, and the frameworks that they produce are complex and neat. 
However, they are vague in explaining the precise mechanisms involved in how exactly 
particular historical legacies in a country like Poland caused particular outcomes at 
particular times. In other words, they struggle to explain how and why the transitional justice 
and truth revelation issues recurred in the way that they did and at the point in time that they 
did. In particular, these models do not take into account the fact that the ebb and flow of the 
transitional justice issue in cases such as post-communist Poland may have been due to 
political elites actually changing their stance. 
 
Many of the attempts in the literature to tackle changes in lustration trajectory divide between: 
those who focus on the political and electoral-strategic drivers of its protagonists and those 
who ascribe more ideological-programmatic motives to them. My own position on this 
question - set out in my own writings and developed in co-authored work with colleagues 
working on other countries (Williams and Fowler) - and those of others adopting the so-
called ‘politics of the present’ approach was that the issue recurred because it had become 
instrumentalised as an element of the power struggle, or a power tool, in post-communist 
politics. However, on reflection this approach may need to be modified because it fails to 
fully grasp the extent to which the motives of those pushing for lustration and transitional 
justice were, in part at least, programmatically and ideologically driven and not motivated 
purely and simply by partisan interests and instrumental imperatives to gain a strategic 
advantage over political competitors. 
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At the same, as this paper shows, the lesson from the Polish case is that lustration and file 
access have clearly become bundled up with other discourses and political developments in 
post-communist politics which one needs to understand in order to make sense of the issue. 
This paper has identified two such areas which could form the basis for more detailed, 
grounded research both on the Polish case specifically and exploring other cases of ‘late 
lustration’ more generally. Firstly, the idea of pushing forward with more radical lustration 
and file access as an element of broader concerns about the need to deepen and improve the 
quality of post-communist democracy; particularly linked to a perceived need to tackle 
corruption and satisfy the public’s ‘right to know’ the backgrounds of its public officials and 
authority figures. In the Polish case, this has often been bound up with the notion that 
officials linked to the former communist regime had taken advantage of communist-era 
networks to turn their old political power into economic power, which prompted many 
citizens and political elites to question the virtues of the ‘amnesty but not amnesia’ option. 
Lustration, therefore, became entwined with broader discourses on post-communist 
democratisation, specifically the radical ‘Fourth Republic’ critique of post-1989 Poland as 
corrupt and requiring far-reaching political and moral renewal. Indeed, it is precisely the fact 
that the issue of lustration and transitional justice needs to be viewed in conjunction with 
such other factors which explains why polling data, showing Poles supporting a radical 
approach to the issue but not considering it to be a priority, could be misleading when 
evaluating the salience of this issue. Secondly, the lustration and file access issue also became 
embroiled in what might be termed the ‘politics of history’ as a means of questioning the 
legitimacy of political opponents. A prime example of this phenomenon in the Polish case 
relating to the question of lustration and file access was how different assessments of the 
historical role of Lech Wałęsa became entwined in party political struggles.  
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